Towards Better Understanding the Maluku Conflicts

Among the root problems of the Maluku prolonged conflicts chiefly refer to the latent troubles of the deep seated discrepancy on understanding of the causes of the eruption of violence. Many possible causes have been suggested, such as the commonly perceived as religious based conflicts, ethnic discords, economic inequality, Jakarta over-domination, etc. However, as survey we held in early 2002 reveals, most Christians (Protestant and Catholic) perceive that the conflicts have been caused by conflicting stance of the elite either in Jakarta or in Maluku, while the Muslims perceive that the separatist movement of the Southern Maluku Republic (RMS) has dragged along the conflicts. This typically opposing opinions reflect the unresolved local rivalry between groups that is rooted in the conflicting interpretation of the conflict itself.

Comparable unsettled conflicts also plagued larger scope of the divergence within Indonesia since the regime change in 1998. The political change itself was part of past role of the New Order regime, which repressively led the country for over 30 years. Such legacy of diverging political stance between main political tendencies in Indonesia has no wonder created continuous waves of violent eruptions across the country once the central control loosens. Public data taken from few national newspaper have unfolded nearly 19,000 death toll for politically related causes. This observation would like to show that the deadly people-against-people killings in the Maluku -- many have claimed the toll is much higher than the officially admitted of about 9,000 dead—does not merely pertain to local evils. Weak leadership at national level has induced problems in the regions more difficult to deal with.

Understanding the local problems merely bases on the national dimension of the crisis, however, would create no less difficulties when one tries to find ways to resolve the conflicts. The social conflicts basically are localized; national level involvements of any parties indeed should be scrutinized to the public, if any, however, resolution would only be meaningful when local initiatives are to be encouraged. I would like to show you some aspects of the Maluku conflicts that many hold true to understand why the violent conflicts have taken place.

Three dimensions would basically suffice the understanding of the conflicts, i.e.:

Economic imbalance has marginalized the Christians during late Suharto’s rule. Christians consists of about 60% before the regular waves of migration of the Buginese, Butonese, Makassarese, Javanese, etc. particularly in 80s and early 90s. Some major disadvantages, such as the lowering price of cloves that mostly produced by Christian land owners, motivated further grievance. This local observation of imbalance embitters the stark dominant control over resources of the center of power in Jakarta over the regions.

Social, cultural divergence of the groups perpetuates the condition of non-communication. Historical gaps between religious groups have egged on political discrepancy between the Muslims and the Christians, who have been geographically divided during the colonial rule. Attempts to mix the Muslims and the Christians at Poka and Rumah Tiga in Ambon Island have failed, as large state-owned university compound of Pattimura was destroyed to the ground. Gap in education among groups raises the difficulties in communicating among them. Once the gap even helps the division become sharper as rivalry and favoritism unavoidable. Religions are mostly interpreted and translated into (ethnic) groups based understanding when practical life urges people to live out daily morality.

Reliable sources of investigative working groups indeed have reported violent provocations, although many perceive them in disbelief and inaction. However, as part of the whole picture of no law politics, such perpetrations would not to be put into justice. Pursue for justice has been confronted to cause more injustice and (gruesome) violence. Not only those who legally assigned to take guns, i.e. the military and police officers, abuse their integrity and showed poor performance, but goons with guns also flourish as they find employment scarcity along with the economic crisis. Rivalry between the elite military and police officers has bitterly victimized naive civilians. Such contention between armed groups is feared to implicate each institutions.

Some other aspects from inferring survey results:
• Support from below among common people that the conflict can be resolved is unexpectedly quite high as much as 58%, although this may not mean anything when control is not on their hands.
• Most Muslims expressed “more revenge, anger, hatred”, as compared to Christians, worse situations susceptible to provocations to be found among the displaced persons in conflict areas. Women (52%) experienced deep distress. Three quarter of the population were in the same condition of strain.
• The role of the media is crucial for they have the possibility to inform correctly. They should have been able to prevent worse conflicts. However, the capacity of local journalists is still to be further developed. Reports have been produced unprofessionally and group-biased.
• The death toll for the fighting at inter-village/rural level is three time higher as compared to the city/town level of Ambon (as the capital of the then Maluku province). This may relate to the gravity of the deprivation of livelihood and humiliation of general life in rural areas, worse in the so-called “Eastern part of Indonesia.” The New Order government is responsible for implementing the local administration law No. 22/1976 that uproots the tradition of managing villages.

Reconciliation?
• Reconciliation may only be meaningful when it is conducted based on long-term, continuous perspective, coupled with development and education programs, because representative-ness of the participants is confronted by diverse problems.
• Role of central government in Malino II meeting in early 2002 was praised though the government’s short-term interests hindered the prospect of open yet discerned communication among conflicting groups. Police and military officers should have also been more actively involved in the negotiations. Report flows about deserters and undisciplined officers.
• Preference to involve the common people, particularly those victimized for the conflict, should have been heralded in the reconciliation process

This is an excerpt of a presentation I delivered on July 9, 2004 in a Katipunan café in Quezon City of the Philippines before fellows from Asian Public Intellectuals (API) Program and the Indonesian students in Metro-Manila, the Philippines. The meeting was made possible by API's Philippine Host Office. Thanks to Dr. Noelle Rodriguez and Russel Q. Tabisula.