Researcher-editor
Prasetyohadi
A. INTRODUCTION
What was the case/process about? What were the actors involved? What happened?)
Moedrick Sangidu's case at Surakarta and its surrounding was about the relative success of a local politician in a district level in Indonesia in framing political actions for creating pressures to the repressive government by the end of President Soeharto's rule, particularly during the electoral period in May 1997. Moedrick, who led the Surakarta chapter of the Islamic-oriented United Development Party (PPP) since 1995, succeeded in taking political opportunity to put forward the interests of the majority of the people in the concerned areas and, particularly and to certain extent, in the Central Java province.
However, Moedrick's involvement in local politics goes back at least when the actor started being active in the party chapter in early 1980s when he initiated his political carrier in the PPP as the internal security division's head. He and his associates found, at least increasingly since early 1990s onwards, that the regime grew and eventually ended up in a devastating performance as materialized in rampant corruption and thereby self-evidences of injustice, which then he easily picked up as the main issues of his political struggle in the local political constellation. There were a tiny but conspicuous yet well-connected rich people in the midst of considerable percentage of poor people in the town and its surroundings, who continuously drew his feeling of compassion towards the latter.
The PPP officials relatively managed to reach a possible process of democratization since the party carried the powerless opposition party to the front line of local political space. The present powerlessness of the party was caused by the government's repression due to the New Order's policy of "floating mass" (no real political power other than the government allowed). After being appointed the regional chairman of the party, Moedrick and his supporters were confirmed to join and therefore prepare the 1997 general election in which they relatively succeeded in managing political issues of injustice and alternately gathering massive rallies during the electoral campaigns. Subsequently, the local chapter gained matching votes to the ruling party of Golkar. They managed to garner coalescent support from the splintered faction of the Indonesian Democratic Party, which was enduring vacant of power after brutal military crackdown in 1996. The result of the ballot shows that the PPP gained 25.18% more as compared to the previous poll in 1992, although it was still nominally lower than the dominant Golkar's vote gain (PPP: 40.06%, Golkar: 56.61%, PDI: 03.33%).
The single actor of democratization process in this case along with supporters was Moedrick Malkan Sangidu, a long-term activist of the PPP, and since early 1995 was appointed chairman of the Surakarta chapter of the party. He played major role in mobilizing local people, larger than his own supporters, towards and during the electoral period in 1997 to gain more votes for the party.
B. The actual political structure (researchers' attempt)
(a) the relative openness or closure of the system
Repressive government of the Soeharto's regime in 1997 had reached the phase of decline. Public performance of the regime's exponents in the governance had been growing into moral decay so far as the public found much open, raging corruption and the government officials' insensitiveness in delineating and implementing public policy in contrast with the people's common sense. The ruling party Golkar and its allies in the local government of Central Java and its direct subordinates had to perform repression through direct measures and worst farcical justification. This development, on the contrary and unexpectedly, generated a significant political openness for the people's participation in public sphere in the local Surakarta level.
Relative closure of the system might be seen in the measures that were taken by the local government or the office of the local government's attorney and the government-controlled judges in the judicial system. They focused the measures on legalistic approaches by overstressing the electoral rules. Harder than that, the government officials, sometime coupled by the ruling party Golkar supporters, reacted against the PPP street actions with similar ones, which then very often resulted in a weakening political effect of the former in the public image.
(b) the relative stability or instability of the alignments among dominating groups constituting the basis for the established polity
The dominating groups that took firm grip of the established polity were mainly the local governments. They consisted of either at the levels of municipality of Surakarta, personalized by Surakarta mayor Hartomo or of the provincial government in the hand of Central Java's flaunting governor Soewardi, who was still an active high-ranked military officer. The political alignment between both was quite obvious as they joined their political forces, along with their subordinates, mostly civil servants, in the bureaucracy in consistently trying to curb any movement from below.
On the other side, there was a sign of instability as the military at the moment was apparently in tension with the local government stemming from strong rivalry between the army and the civilian sections of the government in the province. There were some major reasons to it. First, the military observed that the government was too arrogant and insensitive in dealing with larger people's interest. Yellowization program was one of conspicuous examples of it. Second, the military also showed a sign of discord with the government upon knowing that even Prince Diponegoro statue, the patron symbol of local military command, was painted in yellow as well replacing the military's official color of dark green. Third, the military was quite overwhelmed in dealing with riots flaring up in April 1997 at various locations in Central Java.
However, this apparent instability might be only temporary and relative because it contradicted common supposition that the government was generally supported by the military. The reason is that there was no sign that the government was directly supported by the military. The military was relatively close to Moedrick and his supporters within the party chapter, instead. With apparent friendly demeanor towards Moedrick, the military turned out to be a kind of facilitator of the local opposition movement. So far there had never been any kind of military crackdown against Moedrick's movement.
(c) the possibility for actors to link up with sectors of the élite
Individually, Moedrick was clearly seen to have a relatively strong capability to link up with the élite, partly due to his choice to proceed the struggle within the formal existing political system. He was a close friend of the then local military commander Major General Subagyo H.S. and hence he had the possibility to see how large was the political space for he himself and the people. The local military commander was reported to be present in several local party meetings, that supposed to be exclusive for intern interest. The military was reported to have approved the anti-yellowization movement. Aside from that, Surakarta Major Hartomo was also among the politically reachable people for him in the town to bargain with. Moedrick might have direct and strong bargaining power in front of the mayor.
Moedrick was successful in drawing the press' interests so far as he often appeared in diverse newspapers' headlines. The press may paramountly become the main communicator to the élite, which generated more public pressure against the élite. Moedrick had a relatively stronger moral conduct than the dominating groups in the government and the military. It was because he has captured sense of justice of the party supporters, and of the public at large.
(d) the capacity and propensity of the state in particular to repress actors
The government repeatedly lashed out and curbed the anti-yellowization movements, set by Moedrick and his supporters, however it apparently consisted of only words and occasional measures, so that Moedrick and his party chapter did not shrink. The propensity of the establishment to repress the actor and his supporters and allies apparently was limited to only overstress the electoral rules and their relative measures. Eerily enough, the dominating groups never employed any ideological idea to repress Moedrick's movement, suggesting moral political failure of the establishment.
The government obviously had the propensity to repress the actors and his party officials. They endured several times of the government's intervention, either by terror, intimidation or formal words, however they did not much matter. There are many examples of the government's propensity to repress the actor. To mention a few, the central government of Jakarta, by means of the attorney-general as instructed by the President, along with the military and police officers told local party activists to respect the pre-electoral regulations. The local government's election monitoring commission (Panwaslakda) supported the police's harsh measures towards party activists who broke electoral regulations. Local police several times raided recalcitrant street campaigners breaking the regulations. Moedrick was summoned in relation to an alleged beating towards a government official who pulled out the party's green flags. A beheaded dog with its separate intestines and a knife were once personally sent to Moedrick in May 1997. The government directly banned the seemingly strong coalition between the PPP and local PDI chapter. The information department in Jakarta banned a local bulletin published by the local PPP chapter called "Suara Bintang" in May 1997.
C. THE ACTORS' REAL PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRACY AND THE GENERAL PROCESS OF DEMOCRATISATION
(If actors themselves don't speak up about this, we search for other indicators of their actual perspective. If an actor don't seem to have any perspective on democracy/democratization, we specify this -- and why that is! If so we also discuss why the aims and demands of the actor anyway is part of and contribute to the process of democratization.)
(1) Content
Why does democratization make sense to the actors? That is, what are the actors really out or and why is it, then, that struggle for democratization becomes instrumental?
When asked "what was the deepest idea of his struggle for", Moedrick referred to the struggle towards the welfare of ordinary people living in the region. The democratization, Moedrick said, was for the poor people in general living in the society. How to direct the process of democratization to the destitute was the main focus of his struggle. He said he saw a lot of suffering of ordinary people, whom he met and who came to him to ask for help. He said he was touched personally by poor people beseeching for subsistence and even calling him to solve trivial dispute in the neighborhood. He said they were the very cause of his struggle for gaining more participation in the local politics that relates to "the idea of democracy" or "the process toward democratic society". Concerning it, he also referred to Islamic values that preached the idea of justice as an inspiration of his and the party's struggle in local politics.
Therefore, according to Moedrick, the people, mostly those who supported his cause, demanded a real part of the whole wealth accumulated in the society, as he claimed that most of the people also realized an unequal distribution of the wealth. He maintained, therefore, that distributive justice, so far as elucidated and manifest in the effort to focusing the people's movement towards fair election, was the basic impelling content of his struggle in democratizing the local political system. Since the beginning of his presence in the chapter in the 1970s he started to build his political character as the people defender to show how justice should be carried out. Particularly, when the content of his struggle was applied to the political frames during the electoral period, he coined his idea of democracy to "fairness" of the election.
Concerning Islam as the original orientation of the party, Moedrick took religion-related issues only whenever he thought that political mobilization required them. He stressed that the party does not base on Islam but on the state ideology Pancasila. However, according to him, it will always keep the Islamic image, because he acknowledged that the party was a fusion of several Islamic parties in 1973. Emphasizing a sort of openness of the party, he said, there is a lot of non-Muslims support the party as well, because the Muslims and the non-Muslims have similarity in ideas about justice and democracy. He also said Islam preached the wellbeing of mankind as a whole and not only for the Muslim community. According to him, Islam should be tolerant and Islamic radicalism was no longer relevant in Indonesia. However, he shrewdly said, "People who say «Islam yes, Islamic party no!» do not know what they are saying. They are only trying to corner the PPP."
2. Precondition
What (according to the actors) is necessary to fight and change in order to promote democracy and democratization? What preconditions for democracy and democratization have to be created?
There are some situations that Moedrick demands as preconditions before democracy and democratization could be accomplished:
Distributive justice, in term of social and economic equality, should be first implemented in the whole walks of life of the people. The democracy requests, according to him, that poor and powerless people, who have so far been split up on a religious and political bases, be granted enough wellbeing such as works thereby sufficient income, that they may perform their basic rights in raising their concerns in a given society.
Strengthening the civil society, not necessarily based on Islamic values, but on the accomplishment of minimum relative justice in general. Moedrick maintained that the people in diverse associations in the public should be given enough say in conveying their basic interests and needs, otherwise they would not be able to perform normally their life in public space.
An opening up of the image of the closeness of the party from the merely Islamic values to the idea of justice. Moedrick urges his colleagues in the party chapter to work hard to practice politics for the people in general. He wants his immediate subordinate in the chapter to act as representatives channeling the aspirations of the people.
Creating the image of clean politicians within the party to enhance the further party's performance in the public. The public bad image that formal politicians within the party are thought only seeking a seat and salary in parliament should be gradually scrapped out and replaced by the integrity of the party's activists.
3. Extent
How much should be democratized? That is, what sectors of the country or the locality (with their political, social and economic spheres) do the actors like to democratize?
According to Moedrick, there are some target extents of his movement, which may be delineated into four fields: (1) Mainly the social and political groupings in the range of Surakarta municipality, which will be elaborated in the political inclusion section of this report. (2) Economic sphere, however, constituted a considerable extended sphere to aim at having more share in the public wealth, mostly work fields for the poor but politically potential people, (3) Political institutions within the existing system was partly also the extent of Moedrick's movement, apart from his personal choice not to join the government-approved local council, (4) Larger religious institution was also partly made up a mass based of the Islamic-oriented party of PPP, which mostly came from the Muhammadiyah social and religious grouping as the second larger religion-based organization in Indonesia.
4. Forms
(a) What democracy do the actors prefer? That is, what structures of democracy would the actors like to have?
(b) What general process of democratization do the actors go for? That is, in what way would the actors like the process of democratization to take place?
(a) What democracy do the actors prefer?
(Focusing on the civil society, starting from local Muslims)
According to Moedrick, democracy in future should firstly focus on the strengthening the civil society starting with people's power based on firstly the Muslim community within the regional formal party chapter. He believed that the nominal majority of the Muslims in the country, and particularly in his region of Surakarta, would presumably support the party's cause. But he also argued that by opening up the close interest of the party to, for instance, the idea of common justice would make up more the image of the party and therefore the party reap and gather larger votes. The party chapter under Moedrick, consequently, also targets at the Muslims in other social and political groupings.
b) What general process of democratization do the actors go for?
(General elections as a paramount mean toward democracy)
Moedrick saw that general election was one of possible means towards democratization process, in which the political parties shared respective participation into the institution of political constellation. He added, general election was also universally acknowledged as an institution and political practice that enabled the formation of representative government as the most acclaimed ideal and optimal achievement of democratic governance nowadays. As the party chapter's chairman, he was convinced of adopting election as his choice to enhance people's participation into governance, and hence popular control would at least affect, or better put, contribute a say to the governance.
(Direct and at the same time representative participation in the existing system)
If the election went normal, no other jeopardizing factors, he said, the people's participation would be necessarily "representative" and not necessarily "direct". However, if the dominating groups insisted to dictate to the people their own interests, more that the people's welfare, the "direct" mean of representation in the form of "mass rallies" would be taken as an alternative to put pressure on them.
(Avoiding strong Islamic interests of the party)
Moedrick took the line of avoiding strong and exclusive Islamic interests of the PPP in order to gain larger participation of the people in general. As he was aware that Muslims are not found only in the specifically his own party and Islam-related associations and yet he aims at their votes, he deliberately took an open line in asserting issues in the public discourse.
(Always conveying the most simplest political issue)
Moedrick said he focused on the most plain and less complicated political issues to be raised in the public to make the public easily caught them. Mostly, the issues were about injustice and arrogance performed and committed by the government's officials and their allies in the ruling party Golkar.
According to the actors, the above should be accomplished by way of:
(Within the existing system, most importantly the rule of law)
Moedrick takes the course of struggling towards democracy within the existing system. He maintained that it was difficult to bring about changes. He then preferred to stress there was no need for new laws, emphasizing the preference of the primacy of law. Legal battle, thereby respecting existing legal system, even though corrupt, was among the best means to adopt and even raise further pressure on the dominating groups. He said the party chapter took the choice of restoring the existing law in the society in general and executing it consistently. The Indonesian constitution has been a good law, he said, only that it was being violated all the time by the ruling regime. To improve the wellbeing of the people, the law has to be respected and there has to be legal justice. At the political level the concept of trias politica should be applied. Real democracy would stem out of the strife to maintain that the executive, legislative and judicial powers should function independently of each other.
D. Actors' own politics of democratization
1. Space
How do the actors' themselves analyze the political opportunity structure? (i.e. what, according to the actors, is possible to do -- and why is that?) (E.g. can one work inside the established political system or not? Does one have to politically create or liberate civil society before working there?)
Actors' analysis of political opportunity structure
(The government's heedlessness prompted political openness)
Moedrick and his associates in the party chapter saw that political development under the New Order regime had reached a phase of "no return". The exponents of ruling party Golkar and most conspicuously its individuals in the government had shown commonly unacceptable attitudes in public policy. Moedrick was quite aware of the people's protracted disgruntle over various repression and injustice practices they had been enduring since. He saw that the insensitivity of the government officials had adversely resulted in that the larger people apart from his own supporters endorsed to his movement. Moedrick saw the political opportunity to adopt was in the reacting the government insensitiveness and shamelessness (tak tahu malu). Moedrick said issues of manifest injustice in the form of corruption and collusion among the government officials and the private sectors gradually becomes paramount reasons of raising issues for political struggle. He saw the possibility of increasing support of the people from below by promoting the idea of justice.
(Trigger of further support from below and therefore larger political openness)
However, the most conspicuous political opportunity, which Moedrick and his associates saw, was the raging measure that later triggered people strong disagreement when the local government of Central Java in late 1996 instructed his officials in the lower levels in the whole region to paint yellow all public objects. Moedrick said he supported the majority of the people's reaction to reject the government's policy. Adopting many commonly unacceptable measures taken by the government might become a vehicle to draw pressure from below to the local élites.
(Military's loose approval)
Moedrick also saw that the military at least supported his and the party's position towards the government's reckless public policy. The military silently supported Moedrick and his party's white painting actions. Moedrick knew that the local military commander did not approve governor the governor's policy mostly for arrogance and insensitiveness in dealing with larger people's interest. The military was also quite overwhelmed when in April 1997 riots flared up at various locations in Central Java in the course toward the general election in May 1997.
(Partly rejecting full participation in the existing system)
Moedrick approved his colleagues at the Surakarta district level taking their choices and political maneuvers towards nomination and later appointment as the local councilors. However, he personally rejected to be appointed as a member of the local council, either at the level of Surakarta district or Central Java province. Apart from that, Moedrick has a separate personal income from his business, inherited from his family background. Even he constantly raised an issue that the provincial council be dissolved, as he saw structurally the institution and its members had nothing to contribute to the people's benefit, but corruption and abuse of the offices, instead. He took this way to overemphasize the focusing preference of justice, alluding that the local councils were the place where the members were committed to rampant corruption and collusion.
(Mass rallies from below and lobbying local élites)
In the local politics in a relatively limited areas such as Surakarta municipality and its surrounding areas, and the Central Java province, Moedrick said he opted to combine the forces from below in mass rallies with people, as many as possible, starting from his party supporters, and from above with lobbying the local élites, and if the time was ripe the national élites should be also approached. It was because Moedrick saw some opportunity learning from the ways how the decay of the New Order regime had become too conspicuous, and yet he realized to have also heaped all the people's supports from the grassroots.
2. Politicization
(a) What issues and/or interests do the actors politicize?
(b) How is that done? (1. by focussing on single issues or ideologies -- and/or by focussing on narrow/special interests or wider/collective interests? 2. by only putting forward demands to the state/government/ boss/company or also by trying to create alternatives on their own?)
Issues and interests
The general election remained an important occasion for the party that its particular issue of "fair election" stemming out of the idea of justice and equality should be developed. Among the electoral issues raised by Moedrick and his supporters are: (1) the unfairness of the government's public policy of painting in yellow any public object as a disguise of electoral campaign (2) coalition issue between the PPP local chapter and the PDI local chapter, (3) vote-rigging issue against the ruling party of Golkar, (4) the impropriety of the government officials being involved in electoral campaign, (5) the prevailing people's desire of quickened social change. Meanwhile, the main interest of Moedrick and his supporters refers to raising votes for the party chapter.
Ways of politicizing issues and interests
(Direct and continuously)
Moedrick directly launched the issue of injustice and equality during the electoral campaign, referring to various violations and abuses of power committed by the government officials and Golkar's exponents. The party chapter continuously stressed on forwarding in the public discourse the very basic single issue of justice coupled with equality, which then applied to diverse similar issues when related and suitable happenings took place, and later and alternately, in the phase of people's mobilization, interchanged with and crystallized into the "white painting actions". This optional issue was adopted repeatedly and continuously by Moedrick and his supporters in order to maximally produce a poignant, straightforward basic idea of justice and equality of the people.
(Coupling the issues of justice with the interest of voting for the party)
During the electoral campaigns, Moedrick and his party exponents almost always raised the issue of injustice committed by the government officials and at the end of the electoral campaign they stressed the interest of voting the party in the ballot. They heaped massive support from the issue of injustice at the first place and launched the interest at the very last moment of the campaign to avoid breaking down the scheduled electoral campaign of gathering as many supporters as possible in the street rallies.
(Developing issue of anti-yellowization through elaborating people's opinion in polling)
Cognitive acknowledgement of the chosen single issue of anti government's policy of yellowization was the first step towards public space, by attaining the one-month observation before publicly announcing the conclusion that "the government's yellowization program contravened public decency". This was political statement based on morality, implicitly sending political signal of resistance to the adversaries, although the party chapter's members themselves apparently already knew what the polling would result in. White is supposedly a neutral color, as Moedrick himself maintained, implying that he suppressed the formal color of green of the Islamic-orientated PPP but also against the yellow dominance of the ruling government party Golkar.
However, the polling, as a way of dealing with the uncertainty of the impact of the government's policy, had created a modality of people's trust. To win people, once again, another polling was carried out after severe counterattack from either local government or the Golkar's affiliated organizations. The local PPP staff of researchers announces in March 11 the poll result asserting that the majority of city dwellers did not agree with the program. It was a kind of confirmation of the people's will to contend their political rights against the authority. This method might only imply a maneuver in conveying pre-conceived political position into the public regardless its scientific integrity that the raised issue might further snowball.
(Direct response to the Golkar's launched issues and movements)
In sharpening the party's own issues, Moedrick attempted to uncover the reasoning in each statement issued by his political opponents (the government and Golkar's exponents) so that the latter gain less votes from the people.
(Open communication with the mass media's people)
Mass communication proves in Moedrick's movement as an effective means to send political signals to the adversaries as well as other political forces which may come together into the same cause or perhaps those who have coalescent potential. Moedrick's capacity to diction compatible to the press tendency was exceptional which then makes him more attractive and the press easily to quote him. As compared to government's officials and even the PDI functionaries, Moedrick has never created any communicative distance to reporters to get information and quotes from him. During the electoral campaign on May he proved himself as a fierce demagogue as well.
(Open ideological orientation of the PPP)
Moedrick did not stick to the party's traditional orientation of Islamic teachings. The PPP itself has changed its ideological character since the fusion in 1971 and later when the Soeharto government compelled political party to adhere to state ideology Pancasila (asas tunggal) in 1983. Moedrick was born out of Islamic family from Muhammadiyah but with a strong abangan background, a middle class Muslim (santri) having relatively strong leaning to religious reform. He deliberately stretched his mind and the issue of the movement to the level of more extended notion of justice. By this mean he was able to invite other political groupings to involve. The internal situation of the PDI after being repressed on July 27, 1996 crackdown expedited the latter to join to Moedrick's movement.
(Alternative effort)
The Surakarta PPP supporters were sometime in an impasse when there was no way out in engendering further movement. To anticipate such a situation, Moedrick built a co-operative association in order to gather the PPP supporters to have regular meetings at least aiming at exchanging information of the economic, social and political development and in the meantime they held occasions to contribute and take turns of sum of money (arisan).
3. Political inclusion
How do the actors try to mobilize people? I.e. with what means do they try to organize and rally people? E.g. do they use populism or clientelism or alternative patronage? Or do they try to integrate (rather than incorporate) people into politics by using some kind of networking with informal leaders or more structural organizing with formal leaders?
a. Political mobilization
(Maximizing personal character for people mobilization through populism)
People mobilization was mainly based on populist personal character of Moedrick, thereby through his populism patronage as the present local PPP chapter with a long-standing experience of political carrier within the party. Moedrick's personal character much helped the task as he was easily involved with common people, mostly even with the poor and the latter did not have much reserve to get close to him whenever they needed his help. All of the movements were not to detach from his populist leaning in approaching the public. His susceptibility towards poor people, who often came to him for help, would readily make him to take their side in front of larger political structure.
(Further notes on Moedrick's personal background as a modality for people mobilization)
As compared to intellectual-inclined and outstanding Muslim politician Amien Rais, who was Moedrick's elementary school classmate, the latter has a "fearless" personal character, unfalteringly involved in physical duel fight. He dares to beat anybody who treats him unfairly. He managed his "cowboy" demeanor to charm to youth mass of people. He was not graduated either from the economic or psychology faculty which he frequented at the Yogyakarta-based University of Gajahmada. He started his political carrier once he joined the Indonesian Muslim Party (Parmusi) in 1971. After the government's political policy of party fusion, he later joined the local PPP and appointed as the chairman of the party youth organization of Pemuda Bintang Belia in 1977-1978. But at the same time he gained galvanizing position by his appointment as the party internal security (satgas) which he enjoyed until 1992. His position as the city neighborhood Serengan sub-district PPP chief in 1985 led him to a more structural involvement until he was appointed the chairman of the Surakarta chapter in 1995.
(Actions engendered further political actions)
After enough struggling to understand the government's attitude and his party supporters' resistance, Moedrick and his confidants in the chapter eventually were confirmed that the idea of white painting already became an adequate choice to show the people's strength vis a vis the state. It was meaningful enough to politically impose the idea into the public space with street action. The party encouragement and co-ordination of the supporters to the street actions by changing the color yellow painted objects into white proved that the relatively conspicuous movement in public space had created a repercussion among the Surakarta town dweller which then generated street protests against the government's unfair policy. And in turn it automatically engendered further political movements.
(Legal battle generated further movements)
Third, legal course in the battle against the government's accusation of transgression existing regulations instilled the people's sense of fairness with contrast to the government's excessive measure in imposing power, even in the form of "such triviality" such as color. It was, in fact, an effective way to open mass communication and people's involvement and mobilization. It generated also people's sense of bravery to challenge the seemingly unshakably powerful government with military machinery protecting their questionable wealth.
(Cooperation with the local Megawati supporters)
Moedrick and his confidants in the party chapter opened wide the door toward co-operation, or probably political coalition with the local PDI supporters, who were desperate in channeling their aspiration after the military crackdown and the deposition of its chairperson Megawati endured by the party in the national level. The coalescent mobilization grew rapidly, which may be seen in the following process: first, painting in white carried out by the PPP supporters; second, painting in read and white by the Megawati supporters; third, while maintaining the issue of doing justice Moedrick accepted the Megawati proposal to "entrusting their votes" to PPP; fourth, asking Megawati's approval although she gave only passive affirmation; and fifth, while during the month of electoral campaign Moedrick supported the waves of massive rallies, finally he turned back to assert that "voting for the PPP is the only way to people sovereignty."
In the overall account of the development of the political co-operation, Moedrick was less active in promoting the mobilization. He first looked at the degree of emotion concerning the suppressed will of the people, since they had already their own agenda in what to do in imagined politics in the comparatively already-set in mind of the electoral campaign. Moedrick has mostly maintained long-term social relation with the PDI supporters. It remained his task to encourage their aspiration and eventually accepted and included into politics them as if it is only his gratuity towards reckless Megawati supporters desperately seeking for space to express themselves, no longer talking about their own fate being suppressed by government. It was the least possible involvement that Megawati supporters can still go ahead in protest against the government.
b. The kind of people included in the mobilization process
The social and political groupings in Surakarta were the core of the target of Moedrick's movement. Larger segments of the society in fact later participated in the movement. There are at least two kinds of people being mobilized whose ways of inclusion into politics correspond with their political character. Here it is worth elaborating several of them:
The PPP circles
These people are those who politically have common interests in the PPP's justice and Islamic-oriented issues, hence the PPP Surakarta chapter did not employ special political maneuver in including them into politics. They may be divided into three groups.
a. Local party supporters
They are the first target of extent of the democratization process developed by Moedrick, constituting the first group of mass base. They are mostly local people gathered mainly at the Surakarta branch of the Muhammadiyah social, religious community. These people enjoy close relation with Moedrick's and they are in the same line with their patron Moedrick's choices and options. There are scarcely complaints in exercising internal democracy within the organization, although the dominant supporters of the party are mostly Muslim, who have the characteristic of less demanding immediate democracy as compared to the liberal.
b. The other chapters of the party
The other chapters are not subordinates of Moedrick who was appointed the chairman of the Surakarta's PPP chapter in June 1995. They have to be persuaded to understand Moedrick's political choice in painting-in-white action. They know each other as they often meet in the central board meetings that they have a good acquaintance of who Moedrick is. In January 1997 the white painting action spread out of the city. Five other chapters in the province, namely Sukoharjo, Wonogiri, Sragen, Kudus and Demak, supported Moedrick by sending letters of support. And they came after the action. Similar happening takes place in larger, farther locations when the coalition of PPP and Megawati supporters came on the way. Both supporters mixed up to each others and took the political course into street rallies in the province, those are in Yogyakarta, Kebumen, Magelang, Semarang, even up to the national level in Jakarta and other province in Bogor.
c. Muslim women participation
There were some women having significant positions in the Surakarta PPP chapter, which Moedrick approves, such as respected Nurjanah Hilal, Endang Masitoh and Siti Zulekha. They were quite outspoken in the chapter's meetings or even in public seminar discussing on political matters. They organized many women in the painting in yellow actions.
However, women's right struggle during the Moedrick's case is actually almost not heard, even though the women suffrage was bigger than men's. There were 172.891 women's and 153.773 men's suffrages, meaning that the women suppose to have two more seats compared to men. At local people's council they suppose to get 22 from among 40 seats. But, it was not heard at all that politicians, even female, speaking for the improvement of women's condition. In the campaigns most of the participants are men, implying that politically women in Surakarta were still much under-represented.
d. Other Muslims
Moedrick saw that there were large number of Muslims, either self-declared or not, in the other political and social groupings aside from the formal Islamic-oriented party of the PPP. He often mentioned that the party chapter wanted to create an open image that the party's cause does not only target the Muslims within the party, but apart from it there are still huge number of prospective voters. According to Moedrick, they presumably also possible supporters, direct or indirectly, of the PPP.
The splintered PDI supporters
Moedrick succeeded in also including large number of nationalist party of PDI which recently had been sacked following the July 1996 crackdown. At least as he focused the movement in the party-supervised area of Surakarta, then most of the included PDI supporters came from local chapter of the splintered PDI. However, as the movement larger resonated even at national level, presumably he garnered larger number of supporters as compared merely at the level of Surakarta mayoralty.
The Megawati supporters are "accident" target groups of Moedrick's movement as he has long social relation with them. In term of cultural category, the abangan background of Moedrick helped open the party to other similar political groupings to join in the movement, mostly are the Megawati supporters. The grassroots people within the PPP's extent have direct contact in everyday life with their counterpart in the PDI circles, which then facilitated the co-operation between both. What Moedrick did within the PPP would easily reverberate in the PDI massive grassroots circles. The coalescent movement between both during the 1997 electoral campaign proved that the extent of Moedrick's movement actually had an even larger participation apart from only Megawati supporters.
People recruited in the movement by way of clientelism approach
Each party involved in the relation among the PPP, the underground people and local businessmen apparently compromised to find a particular way in such political situation developed in Surakarta in the time when Moedrick appeared as the local party's chairman. They are most susceptible to another possible dominating group and become a political tool in the hand of the dominating groups in the political arena, that is ruling party Golkar and its allies in the government. In a similar way, the underground people are also prone to co-operate with Moedrick and his party. In Indonesia, the underworld, used to be labeled as "criminals", is already notoriously known as the political partner of the establishment in a bid to beat down adversaries. In a similar mode of political mobilization, the businessmen are among those loyal to the government since they economically and politically owe to the development program of the government. However, the lower level of businessmen suffered the same injustice as the rest of the mass PPP and PDI supporters, because they gained less concession as compared to the politically better-connected businessmen in the higher level of business deals. For this sensitive political stance, Moedrick may reach them as among his cause supporters.
a. The underworld of Surakarta
Moedrick inherits this world from his father Malkan Sangidoe, who had a close relation with the alleged hoodlum, locally called as preman. But he does not claim the pattern in including the underworld to his party movement of his own. The underworld scope reaches larger even into other political grouping of Golkar. The government party Golkar does not refuse to have also vast connections with the preman., even they are included into part of the economic development program of the government.
b. Local Chinese businessmen
Moedrick and his supporters also managed to reach the local Chinese businessmen into at least supporting his movement, mostly in term of financial aids. As Moedrick has clout among the underworld people, whom many of the Chinese business people ask for protection to their business. For that reason, more opportunities are open for Moedrick to urge the businessmen for the work employment of the premans. The latest service that Moedrick gave to the premans strengthened his political subordination to the underworld. Moedrick deployed these people in many of his movements including the white painting actions. In addition, many of the Chinese are Protestant and Catholic, the religious communities that were also affected by Moedrick in the city. Moedrick asked people in such a scope of religious relation for their support by inducing an emphasis of preferential issue of social harmony and justice among the town dwellers.
4. Student groups
The students were not particularly the PPP's target groups because even they actually had started the anti-yellowization drive before Moedrick launched his first movement in the streets. However, although there were no formal sign that they joined the white painting action, the students were definitely of Moedrick's concern. The student group close to Moedrick's movement was the Fatherland Lovers Student Solidarity (Solidaritas Mahasiswa Pencinta Tanah Air), an alliance of student groups from various universities in the city with its meeting point at the Muhammadiyah University of Surakarta. Many of the students helped the research and development department of the Surakarta PPP chapter. They joined the policy making process and even in the political actions of the chapter. They often held public discussions on the political matters, including anti-yellowization issue. And many of them conducted the PPP's investigation by holding polling on the people's response to the yellowization program.
5. People from the Surakarta palace
The palace square is considered among the most strategic location in the city. Therefore, either the government, the PPP chapter or the responsible of the king palace felt to have their rights over it. The government officials painted yellow and the PPP chapter repainted in white. It happened several times to and fro between yellow and white painting actions. It made certainly the palace guards concerned, moreover regarding to the prescribed government decree in which the palace has to be well preserved. Many of the palace people, in fact, were involved in the white painting action in the palace square. The Surakarta king Pakubowono XII himself supported the action publicly stating that he did like the palace being "politicized" because the palace neighborhood was painted in the dominant party's color of yellow. The forum of the palace defenders eventually sued the city mayor over the yellowization of the palace which broke the law, demanding the mayor to ask for forgiveness to the king and all city dwellers through the press and television and radio stations.
6. Other social groupings
a. Local artists
Surakarta artist circles led by Murtidjono, the head of local cultural center (Taman Budaya Surakarta), echoed the concern that freedom of expression in art cannot be limited only into the color of yellow, although no artist was involved in the painting action. They mostly raised the issue of freedom of expression should be well maintained, because yellowization was among the government's repressive measures over public possibility to express themselves in term of color.
b. Kedung Ombo villagers
Displaced people of Kedung Ombo after the submersion their villages over the dam project in 1990 happened to ask Moedrick for help because Kedung Pring village head Darsono was accused of subversion for suggesting local people to abstain from the election. Police had been trying to arrest him. Moedrick was quite helpful to the man, a deed that he often did. Moedrick set a team of defense lawyers and sent some of his people to guard in case there was some terror against the village people. Moedrick managed to be compromising the Armed Forces' Strategic Reserve commander Major General Subagyo. Even though Subagyo said that Darsono should be punished for subversion, Moedrick managed to release him from threat and terror. The adherence between both remains, even they planned to file lawsuit against the World Bank over Kedung Ombo case.
E. The constituents' view of democracy
The constituents of the Surakarta PPP chapter would include (1) the PPP supporters themselves, (2) the mass grassroots of splintered PDI supporters, (3) students, and (4) network of lower traders at the common marketplaces and some businessmen and middle class professionals.
For most of local PPP supporters, democracy means "to have more a say in the public space". They found that so far they had been suppressed their participation in local politics, even in terms of only voicing out their concerns. In the context of unilateral government's policy of yellowization, most of the constituents said that democracy means "resistance against the oppressor". They feel that Moedrick and his party movement channeled their aspiration, therefore they were ready to directly support the party's movement. During the mass rallies they found quite "freedom" in airing the suppressed public emotion by ways of almost physical behavior of self-indulgence in the mass of crowd up to over 200,000 people in the last round of the electoral campaign in 1997.
The splintered PDI supporters were also of similar outlook with the PPP ones, except that they had different political motives. They were enduring more bitter suppression after the July 27, 1996 crackdown, which made them curbed for not having proper channel to express their grievance during the electoral period, even their national leaders Megawati decided to join in the electoral campaign and promoting to be abstain from the ballot box. They found democracy that was raised by Moedrick in term of "protection of poor people" was suitable to their longing. And yet, the populist character of Moedrick was quite similar with Megawati, who inherited her father Sukarno's legacy of populism. The brave personal character of Moedrick drew more of their sympathy, mostly for the massive supporter of Megawati from the rowdy people in the grassroots.
As for the students, they specifically supported Moedrick during the anti-yellowization drive against the government. The drive that had more symbolical meaning was suitable to the student's political disposition. They were of the position that democracy should be "a critical stance to the establishment and a preference to political changes." They found some of such democracy in the Moedrick movement. However, many of the students were skeptical to the existing political system, including political party, in which Moedrick was confirmed of going through. They expressed the critical stance to establishment by supporting Moedrick in more intellectual contribution, such as backing the polling over government's policy of yellowization and snowballing resistance among the people, starting in the public discourse, to the government by holding political debates and discussions.
Network of lower traders at the common marketplaces and some businessmen and middle class professionals found in Moedrick's movement a kind of "solidarity feeling", because Moedrick himself was a businessman who relied on the basic spirit of free market, thereby openness and fair competition. Therefore, they easily offered help, mostly financial aid, to Moedrick's movement. They were of the opinion that democracy should be firstly directed to "social and political changes" in such as closed and unilateral political system in the local politics, dominated by the government in almost all walks of public life. The ethnic Chinese businessmen also saw that Moedrick was a fair counterpart in business, which was presumably in parallel to his political strife. Political economy allowed both parties to join in resistance against the dominant economic share in the hand of the government and its allies.***
Bibliography
Petra R. de Leeuw, "Islam Yes, Partai Islam …?" Islam, Democracy and Leadership in Contemporary Indonesian Politics, termpaper presented to the Free University of Amsterdam, 1997-1998.
R. William Liddle, Pemilu-pemilu Orde Baru: Pasang Surut Kekuasaan Politik (General Elections during the New Order: Ups and Downs of Political Power), Jakarta: LP3ES, 1992.
Made Tony Supriatma and the Society Information Forum (Wimas, Wahana Informasi Masyarakat), "Mega Bintang: Massa-Rakyat Lokal Menuntut Hak Sipil dan Politik" (Mega Bintang alliance: Local People Demand for Civil and Polical Rights), book draft scheduled to be published by the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI), 1998.
Electoral booklet published by the campaign department of the Democratic People's Party (PRD), "For the Sake of Democracy, the Democratic People's Party Refuses to Bow", 1999.
The case-related publications of diverse newspapers of Jakarta-based The Jakarta Post, Republika, Kompas; Yogyakarta based Bernas; and Semarang-based Suara Merdeka and Wawasan.
Interviews with
Moedrick Sangidoe, Surakarta, May 1998, conducted by Prasetyohadi, Benny Subianto, Wisnu Hardana.
Habib Hasan Mulachela, Surakarta PPP deputy chairman, Surakarta, June 1998, conducted by Teddy Novan.
Prijo Wasono, PRD activist, Surakarta, June 1998, conducted by Wisnu Hardana.
This article was made possible by assistant researchers: Teddy Novan, Wisnu Hardana, and Benny Subianto; Academic supervisors: Olle Törnquist and Arief Budiman; Host organization: The Institute for the Studies of Free Flow Information (ISAI), Jakarta.
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