Jajak Pendapat Partisipatif dan Proses Penyelesaian Konflik

— * Berikut ini adalah usaha yang saya lakukan untuk menerapkan suatu metode survey yang kiranya dapat dikatakan "sangat mempertahankan pendekatan partisipatif". Barangkali dapat dikatakan, "konflik komunal adalah salah satu bentuk tingkat paling ekstrim dari ketiadaan partisipasi masyarakat." Kiranya metode ini dapat diterapkan juga untuk jajak-jajak pendapat yang lain, dalam berbagai bidang kehidupan sosial, ekonomi, politik, lokal maupun internasional, terutama ketika hasil jajak pendapat dan prosedur pelaksanaannya dirasakan meragukan karena ada anggapan penjajakan dilakukan untuk "mempropagandakan" kepentingan pelaku atau pelaksananya. Semoga berguna.—

— * Jika Anda membutuhkan sebuah contoh bagaimana model ini diterapkan, barangkali tulisan saya tentang jajak pendapat bertahap yang dijalankan di Ambon-Lease, Maluku, awal 2002, bertajuk "JAJAK PENDAPAT DAN PERDAMAIAN: Belajar dari Proses Transformasi Konflik Maluku" dapat memberikan gambaran awal. Cara mendapatkannya: lihat pada posting saya terdahulu, dengan cara klik pada item terakhir dalam urutan "Previous Posts" di sebelah kanan atas halaman ini, dan akan Anda temukan posting file tulisan tersebut.—


JAJAK PENDAPAT dapat menjadi sangat bermanfaat dalam membantu dan mendorong proses perdamaian di kawasan-kawsasan konflik. Kerap kali pertikaian dan selisih pendapat memuncak sampai pada bentrok berdarah. Sudah bukan lagi akal budi yang sehat yang berbicara, tapi dorongan nafsu dan kesempitan berpikir yang dilatarbelakangi oleh sikap tertutup, mengggunakan cara apa pun yang dapat dipakai mencapai tujuan jangka pendek. Pada periode pasca-bentrok pun keadaan tutup-komunikasi masih bertahan, karena rasa benci, dendam, dan rasa tak terima masih bersarang. Ini menambah rumitnya proses deliberasi yang sedang dilakukan untuk melerai kusutnya masalah. Jika rasa saling tak percaya sudah mendalam sifatnya, para juru damai pun jadi kewalahan. Kata-kata dan konsultasinya jadi tumpul. Pada saat itu jajak pendapat atau konsultasi kepada masyarakat, kepada semua pihak yang terlibat dalam konflik —sebagai salah satu cara komunikasi dan deliberasi— dapat menjadi berguna.

Tapi bagaimana merancang agar suatu jajak pendapat tak disalahgunakan untuk kepentingan salah satu pihak saja, entah pihak-pihak bertikai atau pun “si juru damai” itu sendiri? Dari pengalaman dan pengamatan, jajak pendapat yang prosesnya tertutup kerapkali justru membuat masyarakat tambah mencibir: Pasti ada udang di balik batu .. polling itu dipakai untuk mendukung sikap politik tertentu. Atau jadi begitu “eksklusif” dan “akademis” atau “pretensius” karena terlalu didominasi oleh para pakar statistik, sosiologi, politik, atau entah ilmu apa yang lain, yang sensibilitasnya kurang memiliki perspektif keadilan kemasyarakatan dan kerakyatan yang berpihak secara seimbang dari bawah.

Salah satu cara handal menyelenggarakan jajak pendapat yang cocok diterapkan di kawasan konflik adalah dengan melibatkan para pihak bertikai itu sendiri, dengan membuka proses jajak pendapat itu sendiri, mulai dari periode awal ketika penyusunan sedang dilakukan. Metode “partisipatif” ini menerapkan prinsip-prinsip transformasi konflik dalam upaya peace-building. Dampak positif yang diharapkan memiliki berbagai dimensi ganda yang mencakup pembaruan segi-segi partisipasi publik dan pemerintahan yang sifatnya positif pula.

Pelajaran dari pengalaman dari Irlandia Utara [Colin Irwin 2001] dapat kita tarik di sini sebagai awal dari proses pembangunan kembali rasa saling percaya di antara kelompok-kelompok masyarakat yang telah tercabik-cabik oleh kebencian mendalam satu sama lain, perusakan lingkungan hidup yang memerosotkan mutu hidup manusia, represi terhadap aspirasi masyarakat. Semuanya telah menyebabkan prosedur saling berembug dengan kepala dingin dan tradisi bermusyawarah yang jujur dan mendalam tak berkembang dalam kehidupan kita bersama, malah dikhawatirkan di banyak tempat sudah lenyap. Pengalaman kita di Indonesia membuktikannya ketika kita saksikan banyak tempat diguncang berbagai kerusuhan, kita tak habis mengerti bagaimana (dan mengapa) justru bentrok berdarah terjadi dan bukan deliberasi dan musyawarah yang jadi pilihan. Otot dan senjata yang bicara, bukan akal budi dan hati jadi panglima.


Beberapa pokok dasar jajak pendapat dan proses perdamaian

JAJAK pendapat bukanlah tujuan pada dirinya sendiri, meskipun memiliki aspek yang “sangat mudah dilihat hasilnya” dalam pendekatan penyelesaian konflik. Proses jajak pendapat itu sendiri sangat penting maknanya. Sebagai suatu program yang independen, para pihak didorong untuk ikut serta dalam proses penyusunan pertanyaan-pertanyaan untuk kuesioner, menentukan timing yang tepat kapan pengumpulan jawaban responden dilaksanakan, kapan sosialisasi atau publikasi hasil jajak pendapat dilakukan dan bagaimana caranya, bagaimana kritik, saran, tanggapan pasca publikasi disalurkan dan ditindaklanjutkan, dsb.

Pada galibnya, semua caranya sedapat mungkin diserahkan kepada para peserta-pihak sesuai dengan apa yang mereka yakini sebagai paling membantu untuk mengembangkan proses bersama menuju perdamaian. Kerja bersama ini dalam bentuknya yang paling ideal akan menjadi bagian dari proses yang penting yang tak mungkin dikerjakan oleh salah satu atau sedikit pihak saja, misalnya kalangan pakar di perguruan tinggi saja secara tertutup.

Proses pembangunan perdamaian yang efektif menuntut pendasaran kembali yang memungkinkan semua anasir masyarakat bekerja kembali secara wajar dan produktif. Setidaknya ada tiga segi yang layak disimak dalam proses transkonflik. Pertama, tidak adanya dialog yang memadai di antara mereka yang bertikai sebisa mungkin haruslah disilih dengan saluran-saluran komunikasi yang memungkinkan wacana yang jujur tentang semua masalah pokok yang diidentifikasi jadi sumber suatu konflik. Kedua, jika deliberasi sudah mencapai titik kerja yang optimal, proses diskusi haruslah mengarah pada negosiasi yang konkret dan proses pengambilan keputusan atas semua anasir dari suatu kesepakatan bagaimana memecahkan masalah praktik kehidupan sosial yang gagal dan lembaga-lembaga politik yang tidak berfungsi selayaknya. Ketiga, jika suatu kesepakatan sudah tercapai, kesepakatan itu haruslah dilaksanakan sepenuhnya, dengan kesungguhan, perhatian untuk mencapai keberhasilan, seperti halnya negosiasi-negosiasi itu juga selayaknya dilakukan dengan sungguh-sungguh. Peace-building menuntut sikap terus waspada dan kesabaran, sementara semua pihak haruslah dilibatkan, termasuk di tingkat nasional dan internasional, jika memang kita hendak menyudahi kebencian, penolakan, bentrok kekerasan atau perang.

Bersamaan dengan jajak pendapat sebagai suatu prosedur peace-building, para pihak terlibat dalam hidup bermasyarakat dapat meningkatkan semua proses sosial politik yang sifatnya mendasar dengan cara membantu dan mendorong penyelenggaraan dialog nyata dan komunikasi efektif; menjelajahi berbagai permasalahan dan kemungkinan pemecahannya; memilah-milah dan menentukan masalah-masalah kritis dan genting dan berbagai kaitannya; dan tentu saja diharapkan mendorong proses perdamaian agar tetap berjalan pada relnya yang benar. Tekanannya di sini adalah “meningkatkan, membantu dan mendorong”, sebab jajak pendapat tidak akan mengubah masyarakat. Jajak pendapat hanya dapat membantu dan mempermudah suatu proses yang akan harus dijalani oleh suatu masyarakat dan para wakil mereka. Perlu di sini diutarakan beberapa pokok yang selayaknya dipegang.


Beberapa hal yang harus dilakukan dan sebaiknya dicegah
dalam melakukan jajak pendapat untuk proses perdamaian

1. Upaya deliberasi menuju tersusunnya kuesioner jajak pendapat dalam transkonflik haruslah mencakup semua aspek penting dalam kehidupan sosial politik yang terpengaruh oleh semua lembaga publik dan pemerintah.
2. Mendorong para pengambil keputusan penting (tokoh-tokoh kunci) dalam proses penyusunan rancangan jajak pendapat, baik materi kuesioner maupun caranya (metode).
3. Jika ada tokoh-tokoh penting yang tak setuju dengan hasil jajak pendapat, ajak mereka dalam penyusunan rancangan jajak pendapat tahap berikutnya. Jajak pendapat atau konsultasi kepada masyarakat selayaknya tetap dibuka kemungkinan mengenai berapa kali harus dilakukan. Bergantung pada deliberasi para pihak, sensitivitas masalah, capaian negosiasi.
4. Untuk mempertahankan tingkat kredibilitas jajak pendapat, barangkali perlu pula melakukan pengujian murni untuk memperlihatkan independensi dan kesahihan yang sepenuhnya.
5. Jangan sampai tak mengikutkan pihak-pihak berkonflik yang sifatnya penting dan vital peranannya.
6. Jika pihak-pihak kaum mapan atau mereka yang masih bersikeras dengan konflik tidak bersedia ikut ambil bagian dalam jajak pendapat, jajak pendapat dimulai dengan mengikutkan mereka yang lebih kurang keras sikapnya, yang jadi bawahan atau afiliasi dari kelompok keras.
7. Mulai dengan mendeliberasikan masalah-masalah yang sifatnya membangun rasa percaya diri, mulai dari yang sederhana.
8. Mulai dengan membicarakan hal-hal yang sifatnya prosedural terlebih dahulu, baru belakangan hal-hal yang sifatnya substansial.
9. Harus dihindari pilihan-pilihan yang sifatnya ekstrim, dan lebih banyak mencari titik temu (common ground).
10. Bisa jadi beberapa pertanyaan yang dirancang untuk jajak pendapat publik yang sudah disetujui semua pihak, akhirnya tak dapat ditanyakan pada masyarakat karena tak ada tempat/halaman/space lagi. Hal ini tak seluruhnya buruk, karena yang telah disepakati dapat menjadi dasar kerja untuk jajak pendapat berikutnya.
11. Semua persyaratan dan keberatan terhadap proses perdamaian perlu dibahas secara sistematis, sebab umumnya kalau terpaksa orang akan lebih memilih “berselisih” daripada “bentrok”/perang.
12. Jangan mencoba menghindari masalah-masalah yang sifatnya sensitif. Sebab, masalah yang sensitif itu sangat mungkin akan sangat merugikan salah satu pihak.
13. Masyarakat harus mendapatkan kesempatan untuk menerapkan hak-hak sipilnya dalam proses demokrasi. Diharapkan —entah kapan dan bagaimana— pesan, sikap dan posisi mereka dapat difahami oleh mereka yang jadi wakil dalam pengambilan keputusan publik.
14. Harus disusun pertanyaan-pertanyaan yang sifatnya dapat menampilkan ranking dari masalah-masalah pokok dalam konflik dan peluang pemecahan yang paling potensial.
15. Harus dirancang pertanyaan-pertanyaan yang mengandung anasir potensial menuju kesepakatan final.
16. Jangan sampai terseret-seret oleh komplesitas masalah. Masyarakat yang hidup di tengah-tengah situasi sulit atau konflik justru sering memiliki pemahaman konflik yang sangat mendalam.
17. Gunakanlah cara analisis yang memantulkan prosedur pengambilan suara yang wajar dilakukan dalam proses negosiasi.
18. Kesepakatan-kesepakatan yang sifatnya luas, umum dan menyeluruh perlu diuji kembali. Salah satunya dengan cara mengelompokkan jenis-jenisnya. Dengan memandang dan menilainya secara seimbang dan dalam kacamata yang lebih menyeluruh, anasir masalah-masalah yang sifatnya problematik dan dilematis akan dapat dipecahkan bersama-sama dalam proses deliberasi para pihak bertikai.
19. Masalah-masalah yang sungguh sulit diterima haruslah disorot secara khusus. Ini diperlukan dalam proses menuju pencapaian suatu kesepakatan penyelesaian yang sifatnya menyeluruh, kalau saatnya memang tepat dan bagus dilakukan.
20. Timing harus dipertimbangkan masak-masak. Misalnya, kalau suatu jajak pendapat yang bermaksud mendorong tercapainya suatu bentuk kesepakatan final-menyeluruh dilakukan sementara pihak-pihak bertikai justru mau “menggunting dalam lipatan”, sangatlah tidak tepat diteruskan. Atau bayangkan melakukan jajak pendapat hanya beberapa hari setelah suatu upaya kesepakatan kandas dilaksanakan ..
21. Cobalah mengontrol persoalan keuangan. Harus ada funding yang sungguh independen. Jangan sampai ada pihak-pihak yang terlibat dalam proses jajak pendapat melakukan veto karena barangkali pada detik-detik akhir mereka berubah pendapat jajak pendapat ini akan merugikan mereka.
22. Jangan menggunakan jajak pendapat untuk menegosiasikan lagi kesepakatan yang sudah dicapai.
23. Jangan mengandaikan bahwa pekerjaan jajak pendapat telah selesai ketika kesepakatan dalam penyusunan rancangan jajak pendapat telah dicapai/ditandatangani, terutama jika masalah-masalah yang diangkat dalam jajak pendapat itu tidak dibicarakan dalam kesepakatan yang telah dicapai.
24. Bahkan jika suatu target pencapaian keputusan penting yang rumit akan harus diraih, semua pihak yang bersikap kritis terhadap proses itu haruslah ikut serta di dalamnya, sekalipun proses jajak pendapat dan transformasi konflik itu akan jadi sulit sekali.
25. Jika pihak-pelaku kunci menolak bernegosiasi, pihak-pihak yang netral harus diajak untuk memberikan usulan-usulan yang konstruktif.
26. Jika pihak-pihak kunci mencoba memasukkan pertanyaan-pertanyaan yang dimaksudkan untuk menimbulkan hasil yang negatif, harus ada pihak netral yang mampu mengritik pertanyaan-pertanyaan semacam itu.
27. Perlu dirancang pertanyaan-pertanyaan yang mendinginkan jika sampai pada titik dilematis “pilih ini atau kehilangan itu”.
28. Jika dukungan untuk jajak pendapat sifatnya terlalu bermacam-macam, dan tak ada pattern yang jelas, perlu berkonsultasi seluas-luasnya pada berbagai pihak dan kalau perlu merancang pertanyaan yang sifatnya melawan keinginan beberapa pihak.
29. Harus ada dewan penasihat yang memiliki pengalaman yang siap mendukung jika suatu keputusan harus diambil berkaitan dengan proses dan hasil jajak pendapat.
30. Sejauh mungkin melibatkan tim penguji interdisipliner.
31. Perlu mengevaluasi proses jajak pendapat: kemajuan apa yang telah dicapai?
32. Pihak-pihaklah yang memutuskan kapan jajak pendapat terakhir akan dilakukan.


TONGGAK-tonggak perjalanan kehidupan masyarakat yang bertikai perlu ditentukan kembali mana yang tepat dan sesuai menjadi titik tolak dari suatu deliberasi untuk melakukan penyusunan kuesioner jajak pendapat. Proses bersama para pihak ini akan menuntut kreativitas dari para penyelenggara untuk mengeksplorasi cara-cara menyusun pertanyaan, metode kerja bersama dengan para pihak. Barangkali dibutuhkan waktu tak sebentar untuk bolak-balik memperbaiki rancangan jajak pendapat, supaya temuan-temuan baru dimungkinkan dalam proses yang bisa jadi melelahkan tapi tak kalah menantang dan menarik.

Keberhasilan sebuah jajak pendapat sangat tergantung pada dimensi kualitatif yang dijalani bersama. Pekerjaan teknik dengan komputer dapat direkayasa sedemikian canggih, tapi mengapa tak juga menjalankannya dengan cara sederhana namun jitu. Suatu jajak pendapat akan jadi bernilai hanya jika ada keprihatinan, rasa peduli dan perhatian yang sungguh-sungguh untuk terus mencari manakah pertanyaan-pertanyaan kuesioner yang paling tepat dan jitu. Tenaga dan sumber daya akan tercurah banyak dalam proses ini. Menemui responden dan mengumpulkan lembaran terjawab mereka barangkali hanya butuh waktu beberapa minggu saja, tapi proses merancang kuesioner bersama dengan para pihak barangkali memerlukan waktu yang lebih panjang. Barangkali beberapa langkah berikut ini dapat dipertimbangkan.

Langkah-langkah dasar transkonflik dalam proses jajak pendapat

1. Mengirimkan surat resmi kepada semua pihak untuk ikut serta dalam proses jajak pendapat menuju penyelesaian masalah konflik Kalimantan-Madura, yang isinya:
(a) Akan diselenggarakannya proses penyusunan rancangan jajak pendapat secara bersama di antara para pihak
(b) Tentatif pelaksanaan jajak pendapat (pengumpulan lembar jawaban responden, analisis, sosialisasi/publikasi)
2. Pertemuan pertama
(a) Bentuk pertemuan: diskusi & deliberasi
(b) Peserta: para wakil pihak yang secara tentatif diajak masuk ke dalam proses
(c) Tujuan: untuk menentukan wakil-wakil pihak (sebagai negosiator pihak) yang akan mendapat tugas untuk menentukan cara (metode), topik, penentuan waktu pelaksanaan, sosialisasi (penerbitan, penayangan, dll.)
3. Rancangan pertama kuesioner yang disusun oleh tim pelaksana dikirimkan ke pihak-pihak untuk dijadikan bahan diskusi (pertimbangan, penentuan)
(a) harus disertakan dalam rancangan itu ringkasan sikap pokok dari masing-masing pihak berkaitan dengan cara (metode), topik dasar pertanyaan dalam lembar kuesioner, penentuan waktu pelaksanaan, sosialisasi (cara, waktu).
(b) harus dicantumkan juga siapa saja pihak-pihak yang terlibat sehingga cukup ada kebebasan dan keleluasaan untuk membicarakan berbagai hal yang dapat muncul dari setiap pihak satu sama lain.
4. Pertemuan kedua
(a) Peserta: semua pihak yang nantinya telah ditentukan
(b) Tujuan: membahas rancangan kuesioner, dari pertemuan diharapkan muncul usul, kritik, dan saran dari setiap pihak tentang mana yang perlu diubah atau ditambahkan
5. Surat resmi ketiga
Isinya:
(a) Notulen pertemuan sebelumnya
(b) Ringkasan dari semua catatan dasar dari kritik, saran, tambahan, pengurangan, dll.
6. Percobaan jajak pendapat
Tujuan:
(a) Mengidentifikasi kesulitan pekerjaan lapangan dalam proses mengumpulkan lembar-lembar jawaban, terutama berkaitan tingkat pemahaman sukarnya atau mudahnya pertanyaan dan lamanya proses mengumpulkan untuk setiap responden.
(b) Mengabarkan kepada semua pihak bahwa proses jajak pendapat sudah sampai ke tahap ini dan bahwa diharapkan mereka segera mengidentifikasi setiap perubahan dari detil kuesioner satu per satu, termasuk jika diusulkan mencabut sementara pertanyaan tertentu untuk ditunda dalam pelaksanaan jajak pendapat berikutnya.
7. Melakukan perubahan final oleh penanggung jawab seluruh jajak pendapat, berangkat dari hasil-hasil percobaan di lapangan. Perubahan-perubahan harus secara jelas diberitahukan dan dikirimkan secara tertulis kepada pihak-pihak. Di dalamnya disertakan schedule jajak pendapat dan kapan pelaksanaan sosialisasi (publikasi).
8. Pelaksanaan proses pengumpulan lembar kuestioner

Setelah tahap 7 dilalui, tak satu pihak pun boleh campur tangan lagi dalam seluruh proses pengumpulan jawaban responden, analisis data, dan publikasi (??). Semua hasil laporan penghitungan angka disampaikan kepada pihak-pihak dan mereka bebas menyampaikan kritik atas temuan-temuan mereka sendiri.


Latar belakang survey jajak pendapat

1. Siapa saja, pihak-pihak mana saja: kelompok, lembaga, asosiasi, bahkan barangkali partai politik mana yang memiliki mandat dari rakyat secara demokratis dalam pengertian yang paling jujur?
2. Pihak mana saja yang mewakili kelompok sikap radikal, moderat, atau yang tengah-tengah?
3. Pihak-pihak mana saja yang mewakili kelompok-kelompok yang terlibat dalam konflik?
4. Pihak mana saja yang kehadirannya memiliki makna sentral dalam upaya menuju perdamaian?
5. Menghubungi pihak-pihak yang harus terlibat dalam proses perdamaian, dan pihak-pihak yang mau berbuat apa saja untuk mencapai perdamaian. Undang mereka untuk ambil bagian dalam program jajak pendapat ini untuk mencapai perdamaian.


Pokok-pokok yang harus dilakukan dalam survey jajak pendapat

1. Harus dicapai suatu persetujuan terhadap pelaksanaan program jajak pendapat dengan para pihak, yang bersangkutan dengan beberapa detil pokok ini: topik yang akan jadi fokus jajak pendapat, metode (struktur sampel, berapa banyak responden, proses distribusi lembaran kuesioner dan proses pengumpulan jawaban, style pertanyaan yang dipakai, dll.)
2. Bersama-sama dengan para pihak, perlu dilakukan pengujian semua pilihan pertanyaan yang intinya mengarah pada pemulihan rasa percaya diri masyarakat, berbagai masalah dan pemecahannya, hal-hal yang sifatnya prosedural dan substansial, dan rasa keprihatinan dari masyarakat sejauh berkaitan dengan konflik itu sendiri, dll.
3. Hasil jajak pendapat haruslah disosialisasikan, diterbitkan, ditayangkan, atau menggunakan cara-cara lain dalam publikasi massa, ditayangkan dalam internet secara detil dari hasil laporan jajak pendapat. Hasil itu ditujukan kepada para pihak bertikai, NGOs dan IGOs yang terkait, pemerintah, yang diharapkan akan memberikan dukungan pada proses perdamaian ini.
4. Dukungan tetap terus perlu dilanjutkan untuk para pihak, sampai implementasi hasil kesepakatan dicapai, ketika lembaga-lembaga yang melakukan pembaruan terus melakukan upaya melaksanakan kesepakatan seoptimal mungkin, bahkan juga ketika masih ada banyak masalah lain yang belum dapat disentuh yang telah diidentifikasi selama proses jajak pendapat.

Kalkulus melukiskan kenyataan transformasi konflik dalam angka

Seperti umumnya jajak pendapat, bentuk pertanyaan-pertanyaan dalam kuesioner umumnya dirancang secara “tertutup”. Namun, perlu diangkat model pertanyaan dan penghitungan yang sifatnya tidak hanya hitam-putih, ya atau tidak, tapi juga melukiskan rumitnya kenyataan di lapangan, tingkat-tingkat perbedaan sikap dan pilihan, banyak dan rumitnya akar masalah konflik, dan membuka peluang untuk responden menjawab secara terbuka (meski tentu terbatas). Model kuantitatif ini dirancang berdimensi sangat kualitatif.

Contoh:

Apa sikap Anda tentang beberapa pendapat ini?
a) Orang Madura, relatif semuanya bersama-sama, kembali secepatnya dalam beberapa bulan mendatang
b) Orang Madura kembali secara perlahan-lahan, bertahap, dalam jangka waktu 2 tahun
c) Orang Madura kembali secara perlahan-lahan, bertahap, dalam jangka waktu 3 tahun
d) Orang Madura kembali secara perlahan-lahan, bertahap, dalam jangka waktu 5 tahun
e) Orang Madura kembali secara perlahan-lahan, bertahap, dalam jangka waktu 10 tahun
f) Orang Madura kembali secara perlahan-lahan, bertahap, dalam jangka waktu 20 tahun
g) Orang Madura jangan pernah kembali lagi ke Kalimantan

Menurut Anda, apakah akar masalah konflik Kalimantan-Madura? (berilah ranking)
a) Lingkungan alam Kalimantan, misalnya hutan, telah dikeruk dan jadi rusak oleh siapa pun yang terlibat di dalamnya (orang pusat, orang daerah)
b) Pelaksanaan hukum yang tidak konsisten: polisi mau dibayar supaya tahanan/tersangka pelaku kejahatan yang ditangkap
c) Kekejian orang Dayak, Melayu, dll., “kok tega-teganya menebas kepala, sampai ke anak-anak kecil”
d) Kecemburuan ekonomi, sosial dan politik dari kalangan non-Madura, terutama masyarakat Dayak, di Kalimantan.
e) Tingkah laku orang Madura yang kurang ajar, tidak sopan, ekspansif, mencuri, merampas, dll.
f) Persaingan kekuasaan, manuver politik dan akses ekonomi dari kalangan elit politik lokal di Kalimantan
g) Persaingan kekuasaan, manuver politik dan akses ekonomi dari kalangan elit politik nasional di Jakarta
h) Keterbelakangan masyarakat Dayak dalam semua segi kehidupan: pendidikan, ekonomi, kekuasaan
i) Konflik terjadi karena ketidakadilan hubungan perempuan dan laki-laki
j) Konflik agama antara Islam dan non-Islam (Kristen)


Skala rentang sikap responden — dari satu sampai lima

1 = Anda percaya pilihan sikap Anda ini nilainya sangat penting, jadi bagian mutlak penting dari suatu upaya perdamaian dan karenanya harus dilaksanakan apa pun halangan dan resikonya (sangat penting dan perlu, essential).
2 = Pilihan Anda ini memang tidak Anda pandang “sangat penting” seperti pada urutan no.1 tapi, kiranya pilihan ini atau yang kiranya sejenis dengan ini adalah gagasan yang bagus dan bermutu, karena karenanya dapat dilaksanakan atau diterapkan (bagus meski tidak sangat penting, desirable).
3 = Anda tidak akan menilai pilihan ini “bagus” seperti pada pilihan no. 2, jika Anda diberi kesempatan untuk memilih atau menentukan, tapi sekalipun demikian Anda bersikap “baiklah, saya dapat hidup dengan layak, meskipun keadaannya sedemikian.” (yah dapat diterimalah, bolehlah, acceptable)
4 = Anda tidak menginginkan pilihan ini, tapi karena Anda jadi bagian, langsung maupun tidak langsung, dari seluruh permasalahan yang melanda Kalimantan-Madura, Anda toh akan bersedia menerima keadaan itu (apa boleh buat, saya tak bisa berbuat lain, tak bisa pula melawannya, saya terpaksa terima, tolerable).
5 = Pilihan ini sungguh sulit diterima akal sehat, apa pun alasan dan situasinya. Anda tidak akan menerima pilihan atau pendapat ini, meskipun pilihan ini dipandang sebagai bagian dari proses penyelesaian permasalahan Kalimantan (sama sekali tak dapat diterima & harus ditolak, unacceptable).


Kata kunci proses jajak pendapat

Perlu dirancang, dilakukan dan diterbitkan hasil-hasil jajak pendapat yang didasarkan pada upaya membangun kembali rasa percaya satu sama lain, keinginan dan kehendak warga masyarakat untuk mencapai suatu penyelesaian masalah lewat jalur negosiasi. Capaian jajak pendapat ini dapat memberikan atau menjadi usulan awal menuju ke suatu kesepakatan yang sifatnya seluas-luasnya dalam rentang perspektif politik yang diperlukan untuk transformasi konflik.


Check-list jajak pendapat

1. Lembaga intelektual manakah di kawasan konflik yang memiliki kinerja ilmu sosial yang bagus dan memadai?
2. Pakar atau akademis yang memiliki pengalaman dalam bidang survey jajak pendapat di kawasan konflik dan memiliki interes pada proses perdamaian?
3. Apakah ada akademisi yang dapat memberikan dukungan tambahan dari bidang studi politik, hukum, geografi sosial, bahasa, studi media, dll.?
4. Apakah ada NGOs atau IGOs yang memiliki interes pada kawasan konflik itu dan dapat memberikan dukungan finansial dan dukungan kebijakan dalam bidang survey?
5. Apakah terdapat pusat penelitian yang bekerja di daerah konflik dan pernah melakukan jajak pendapat di kawasan tersebut?
6. Bagaimana profil demografi kawasan konflik tersebut: jumlah penduduk, suku bangsa, geografi sosial, bahasa, pendidikan, umur, dll.?
7. Apakah terdapat surat kabar atau bentuk media massa yang lain —entah cetak maupun elektronik— yang mendukung proses perdamaian?
8. Apakah ada media massa yang dibaca, didengar, ditonton, dicerap oleh berbagai kelompok dan komunitas, dan kemudian bersedia menerbitkan atau menayangkan hasil jajak pendapat dan bekerja sama dengan media lain dari komunitas yang berseberangan sikap politik? Apakah ada kelompok peace journalism di kawasan konflik?
9. Beberapa bidang pokok pertanyaan untuk kuesioner masih membutuhkan eksplorasi yang lebih luas lagi. Tentang mana yang akan dipilih untuk jangka pendek, barangkali adalah persoalan lain yang juga membutuhkan penentuan. Namun barangkali sedikit contoh ini dapat membantu.


Variabel dependen:

a. Apakah akar masalah konflik Maluku: berapa banyak, serumit apa, kaitan satu sama lain?
b. Pendapat tentang hak asasi manusia: bagaimana pun manusia tidak boleh dilukai apalagi dibunuh, dibantai secara massal? Tingkat kesadaran moral dalam ukuran Kohlberg, misalnya?
c. Bagaimana sikap masyarakat terlibat konflik?
d. Bagaimana sikap masyarakat terhadap persoalan pemulangan, relokasi, dll.?
e. Bagaimana tanggapan masyarakat tentang upaya-upaya pemerintah dan masyarakat sipil, misalnya dengan kebijakan darurat sipil yang sudah berlangsung selama hampir tiga tahun ini?
f. Bagaimana selayaknya orang bertingkah laku dalam hidup sosial di mana diandaikan orang bersikap sopan santun satu sama lain, saling menghormati satu sama lain, dst.?
g. dst.

Variabel independen:
a. Latar belakang responden: umur, jenis kelamin, tingkat pendidikan, pekerjaan [pekerjaan selama enam bulan terakhir, dua minggu terakhir], suku bangsa, menikah atau tak menikah, jumlah anak, tingkat pendapatan; untuk orang Madura: sebelum rusuh tinggal di mana; untuk migran atau pendatang: sudah berapa lama tinggal di Kalteng, proses migrasi - spontan, transmigran, dll.
b. Sampling responden: jumlah minimal 1.500 lembar (?) untuk representasi dari masing-masing pihak, lokasi-lokasi ditentukan oleh para pihak. Antara lain: (a) IDPs Madura di pulau Madura [Sampang, Bangkalan, Pamekasan, Sumenep], Kalimantan Selatan, kawasan Jawa Timur yang lain; (b) masing-masing sub-suku masyarakat Dayak; (c) suku-suku yang lain; (d) perbedaan pedalaman dan kota, dsb.

Jakarta, Januari 2002
oleh Prasetyohadi

The Ever People-Elected Mr. Clean-Hesitant

By Prasetyohadi, Markus Yumartana, Alexander Seran



Nowadays democracy no longer expects someone originating from strong military institution with dark past, even if already retired, to be chosen to lead a modern country. That’s what came up however recently in Indonesia, a former high-ranked military officer, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 55, won landslide run-off presidential election. Indonesia seems to have curiously elapsed the past over-30-year nightmare of Suharto regime. And yet, though this was the first direct presidential election ever held in the over half century history of the country, people express no exuberance.

Turbulent, failing Indonesian state since regime change in 1998, seeing the country in disarray, plagued by prolonged political conflicts in the center, and scattered insurgencies in the peripheries, claiming tens of thousand lives, along with rampant corruptions up to the lowest levels across the country, has been bound to long for more stability projecting figures at the top. Megawati’s political party, once hallmark of democracy during hard time under Suharto, was seen failing to show the minimum popular tolerance.

The shadowy legacy of authoritarian regime remains intact, in fact, marked by political leaders playing fool of people expectation for better condition in the midst of hardship, and during Megawati’s tenure such practices seen blatantly conducted instead of showing more any positive indications, not even in her party’s public performance. No notorious military generals are put into jail for human atrocities in East Timor in 1999. Even rights monitors have not wiped out Mr. Yudhoyono himself from list of “number 26 in the priority 2 of those should be further investigated” for rights violation in East Timor.

With such sheer power along with quite popular disappointment towards too little has been done by Megawati, no wonder why sweeping milestone election for Mr. Yudhoyono is unstoppable as the vote counting goes on. The last two elections in 1999 and 2004 have shown pretty different trends as compared to aliran politics previously gripping the home of largest Muslim adherents in the world.

Rational voters’ calculation and mass psychology factors performed by the media have nourished Mr. Yudhoyono’s ostentatious figure that has been proven much less capable by brainless Megawati and her party. Though, Mr. Yudhoyono still managed time to have doctorate exam in development studies at a state agriculture institute and graduated on Sept 18, two days before the runoff ballot day.

Indonesia has apparently become peculiarly pragmatic in their future options, putting democratic reform into harder challenges ahead. Election result is deemed not to change with 60-40% overwhelming for Mr. Yudhoyono, though the official result is yet to announce in Oct 5. In the region where Megawati has the staunchest supporters, like Bali, the balance has even changed considerably yet no major election-related violence took place as once happened.

Mr. Yudhoyono’s public figure of presenting himself as calm, almost even relax, typically Javanese style, yet forwarding “law” than any other options, in the midst of regional insurgencies, may have far attracted those particularly in the inner Indonesia who are fed up by prolonged economic crises and bloody civil and military fighting across the archipelago.

Mr. Yudhoyono came to the public for the first time when he took office of the social, political chief-of-staff of the military in 1998. As he saw no future in the military dominated by rougher elements of its kind, former President Wahid happened to pick him up to deal with Suharto’s wealth while heading a minor ministry, a farther turn of Mr. Yudhoyono’s start of political carrier out of the military.

Although coming from a family of lower military rank, he remains considered, if any, among the intimate to the upper circles of political military elite, as he married to a daughter of military general yet close to Suharto, once helping the latter in 1965 bloody crushing of the communists after an alleged coup d’etat.

Critical remark however says Mr. Yudhoyono is not included among military high-ranked officers who support reform within the notorious Indonesia military, such as Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah, mysteriously died while in his position as Kostrad’s chief-of-staff in 2001.

It was a shrewd twist only in 2001, while still as chief security minister, Mr. Yudhoyono decided to set up Democratic Party, which has then taken pretty quick votes of about 10% in the 2004 parliamentary election. Yet Mr. Yudhoyono has not assured much for the better future of this 230 million populated country. No clear cut economic plan ahead, except his relying on the vice president Jusuf Kalla, a businessman hailing South Sulawesi, supported by former leading Golkar Party. In fact, the latter has publicly performed supports more for the contending Megawati’s Indonesian Democratic Party.

In the turn of the presidential campaign, Mr. Yudhoyono promises mostly to be Mr. Clean, by standing from any past major bloody military crackdown. He was graduated from military academy in 1973, identified military’s latter batches less bloody. He got masters degree from military academies from the U.S. and Europe.

Mr. Yudhoyono’s being characterized as slow and hesitant came up every time he has to take decision, he lingers on longer period of inaction. Pundits comment about his unnecessarily taking much time before deciding to be Megawati’s rival while employed as chief security minister. This goes along with unlike most military officers heralding muscles and swiftness, he is marked particular as he likes attending seminars and conferences, including the rare opening dialogues with the flourishing non-governmental organizations.

He has grammar balance, control that the language center awarded him among best Indonesian high ranked officials giving speeches (Suharto is known to be destructive at language.) Yet, hostile comments are not far away. A former minister working along with him as chief security minister said Mr. Yudhoyono kept holding meetings and talking when people were dying for simmering ethnic, sectarian and separatist clashes. Military rivals regret his slowness in decision making when involved in military operation in East Timor.

Two big parties would likely take the other side, if opposition does fit to Indonesian political culture, a possible development that may pose tougher tests for Mr. Clean-Hesitant to cope with any possible bogged down progress, even if both parties ready to offer alternate alliances in the near future.***

Quezon City, October 2004

Prasetyohadi is Indonesian researcher with Asian Public Intellectuals Fellowship in the Philippines, Markus Yumartana and Alex Seran both are Ph.D. candidates in theology and philosophy at the Ateneo de Manila University, Quezon City, the Philippines

`Tempo' attack a sign of weak civil society

The Jakarta Post
Opinion - March 19, 2003


Prasetyohadi, Researcher, Jakarta

Hoodlumism is an endemic socio-political problem in Indonesia. Yet it rarely becomes an open public discussion, as it has become now. The assault on the Tempo magazine office is only the tip of the iceberg.


Commuters on city buses know well that some street musicians act like hoodlums, extorting money from passengers. They consider Rp 100 or Rp 200 given to them an insult, prompting them to issue threats of violence. In some cases, they board buses in groups and force passengers to give them Rp 1,000 each.

"Donations" have long become "extortion", conducted openly, without shame. Bus passengers' pity has turned into annoyance. The hoodlums among the otherwise polite street musicians and beggars are generally unemployed young men, victims to protracted unemployment. The Central Bureau of Statistics in its January 2003 release said that, conservatively, the unemployment rate had reached 30 percent.

In the hoodlum business, members must show loyalty to their bosses to ensure their future. And the greater the number of these would-be hoodlums reflect not only the increasingly keener competition among hoodlums, but that hoodlumism has become more rampant in urban areas. To rent a mob one only needs Rp 20,000 for each person plus transportation and lunch fees.

Practices related to hoodlumism have increased, especially because life has become more open while proper legal practices are still vague. Openness is enjoyed not only by the mass media but also by other activities of assembly, including the organization and transactions of hoodlums.

The police are not uninformed about this, yet they do nothing. It is still unclear whether their inaction is attributable to their incapability or fear. Reportedly, police have acted like protectors of sorts to hoodlums as the police are cash-strapped for their operations.

Hoodlumism is known to be an urban criminal tendency. Hoodlums prey not only on the middle class, but also on the urban poor, including sidewalk vendors, city bus drivers and workers. Hoodlumism or the practice of paying money in exchange for muscle is the most vulgar form of money politics, and becomes worse when mixed up with drug dealing and weapon transactions.

The argument that hoodlumism can be tolerated to reduce unemployment -- a pretext usually forwarded by the bosses of hoodlums and officials backing hoodlumism, is unacceptable. Yet the official public space, in which the mass media find themselves, is now being incapacitated as hoodlums intensify their underworld practices with the support of their established allies.

Hoodlums were earlier employed as private security guards by security authorities to help them deal with the peaceful protest rallies organized by university students. In many cases, these private security guards attacked the students. Such people were also hired by companies -- with the knowledge of the security apparatus -- to deal with labor protests. They also worked for major political parties as their paramilitary-like task forces.

Understandably, there were many instances in which journalists were subjected to violent acts by these people. They were also hired to trigger riots like the one prior to the assault on the office of the PDI headquarters on July 27, 1996 or the massive mid-May 1998 riot that led to Soeharto's downfall.

As one riot after another broke out across the country, hoodlums would always get jobs. The riots in Ketapang, Jakarta in November 1998, in Ambon, Maluku in January 1999 and in Pontianak in October 2000 were but a few examples. In the protracted communal conflicts in Maluku that claimed the lives of thousands of people, those practicing hoodlumism rode on the spotlight of heroism projected by religious groups involved in the conflict.

Ironically, they called themselves the grassroots. Hoodlums use their muscle to attack their enemies (political and economic) under whatever pretext (the interest of the authorities, a dominant political party, a big businessman, a military wing, separatism, internal conflicts of media workers, religion, ethnicity and so on).

In 1980, the Soeharto regime pursued a policy of hoodlum extermination. Their dead bodies were bagged and dumped on public roads. An estimated 8,000 suspected hoodlums lost their lives in this way. The government pursued this policy to maintain stability so that economic development could run as planned. Fearing for their lives, these hoodlums joined the task forces of the three government-sanctioned political parties -- Golkar, the United Development Party (PPP) and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). They sold their loyalty to these government-made parties.

Will this uncivilized method have to be resorted to again?

During the 1945 revolution for independence, young people, amid the lawlessness following the end of Japanese occupation and Dutch colonization, acted in a highly "revolutionary" fashion. Anything associated with the Dutch was attacked and looted. Very often, their victims were Indonesians. Some of these young men later became "heroes of the revolution".

It is hard to accept that this black track record is part of the current process of reform. Regarding the media alone, the editorial office of Jawa Pos daily in Surabaya was occupied by the task force of Nahdlatul Ulama, Banser, in May 2000. A number of students, alumni and lecturers of the School of Sports Sciences, State University of Padang, destroyed the office of Bijak tabloid on July 7, 2000. The office of Radar Cirebon daily in Cirebon, West Java was damaged by the Forum of Communication of Cirebon City Community along with the task force of Ansor, NU's youth wing, on Jan. 18, 2001. The organization of military offspring (FKPPI) mobilized its members to damage the editorial office of Waspada in Medan on Jan. 13, 2001. Then on April 2001, 15 hoodlums supporting the local Mickey Mouse gambling business attacked the office of Sriwijaya Post daily. In Aceh, the office of the Serambi Indonesia daily had to close temporarily after a handmade bomb, reportedly placed by members of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) separatist group in a waste basket in the newspaper's editorial office, went off.

These show the effective and important role of the media, so much so that even "illiterate" hoodlums have a stake in this respect. The media constitute groups with power because they can influence public opinion and attitude. The media may boost or tarnish someone's reputation, or protect business and political interests.

The assault on Tempo, a prestigious magazine, differs from other similar assaults on the media in that this particular attack has become a wake-up call for broader segments of the community.

As hoodlumism is practiced in nearly every aspect of life when it touches the interests of power and business, media workers must mobilize forces just like the mobilization of the democratization movement of the country's middle class from 1994 until the downfall of Soeharto in 1998, following the 1994 ban slapped on Tempo, Detik and Editor. Of course, the mobilization of the media workers must be supported by other groups.

Obviously, those usually harmed by hoodlums such as the urban poor, the workers and ordinary citizens will support this fight against hoodlumism. Without their support, a movement against hoodlumism will be driven only by our middle class, a social group which has proven not to be strong enough to change our rotten social structure.

Surat Undangan dari Seorang Sahabat ...

Seperti orang sering bertanya, saya pastikan: "This is a true story."

"Pertobatan" Rekan Saya, Abu Bakar Riry, Seorang Kapitan Perang dari Ambon ..

Setelah didesak oleh teman-teman saya di tim gabungan Muslim dan Kristen yang sebelumnya sudah berproses dalam usaha “rekonsiliasi”, meskipun agak ragu-ragu pada awalnya, saya bersedia ikut pertemuan “rekonsiliasi” yang diselenggarakan, oleh karena mereka menjanjikan kepada saya peluang untuk mengungkapkan pendapat saya. Ini penting sekali, karena itulah kesempatan buat saya bisa menyatakan uneg-uneg saya yang sangat mengganjal dalam diri saya.

Saya bayangkan betapa senang jika saya bisa berbicara tentang sesuatu yang mengganjal kepada pihak yang ingin saya tuju secara langsung, dengan harapan mendapat tanggapan dan peluang untuk membahasnya. Di Maluku, semasa konflik berkecamuk, berbicara adalah suatu hal yang mahal harganya. Hampir-hampir tidak ada peluang untuk berbicara secara jujur dan secara berarti, pada tempatnya dan mencapai sasaran. Kata-kata sudah jadi sedemikian luntur dan tak bermakna. Selama kekacauan berlangsung di Maluku, semua anggota masyarakat sudah dipaksa ikut mau tak mau terlibat dalam seluruh kekacauan, yang diwarnai dengan kekerasan.

Kekerasan demi kekerasan membuat komunikasi bebas dalam masyarakat semakin lama semakin tidak mungkin dilakukan. Itu terlalu mewah. Tekanan represif dari para penanggung jawab kekerasan, dengan alasan mengamankan, sudah berubah menjadi satu-satunya cara untuk menyelesaikan masalah di Maluku. Padahal cara-cara seperti itu sama sekali keliru, karena menutup kemungkinan berbicara dan membahas masalah secara benar dan terpadu. Ketika orang takut berbicara, dan tidak asal bunyi, maka semuanya jadi buntu. Jalan penyelesaian yang asli tidak mungkin dicapai. Bagaimana pun partisipasi masyarakat adalah syarat utama untuk menyelesaikan masalah. Kami semua ini harus diajak ikut serta dalam seluruh proses. Tentu tidak semua orang bisa ikut. Tapi yang seharusnya ikut karena peranan mereka haruslah diikutsertakan dan didengar pendapatnya, sehingga kemungkinan kebuntuan komunikasi bisa jadi terlerai.

Kami tidak khawatir dengan perbedaan, dengan syak wasangka, dengan kecurigaan. Itu adalah keniscayaan yang justru selayaknya diterima, disyukuri dan karena harus diolah bersama. Tapi, selama masa kekacauan Maluku ini, kami sudah tenggelam dalam kebuntuan ketika prasarana minimal untuk mengungkapkan semua itu sudah dilindas oleh sebuah mesin penggilas yang tak kenal ampun: kekerasan dan rejim yang mendukungnya.

Tak jarang saya rasakan di Maluku, semua orang sudah berada dalam keadaan buntu dan tak mampu melihat jalan keluar, karena memang semua itu tidak dimungkinkan. Mundur tak bisa, maju pun tak tahu mau ke mana dengan pasti. Bukan karena takut, tapi karena semuanya sudah dibuat sedemikian rupa sehingga kami jadi tampak tak mampu berbuat apa-apa. Padahal bukankah masalah-masalah kami adalah masalah kami sendiri. Ketika saya tidak bisa membicarakan masalah kami sendiri atau masalah saya sendiri, terus apa yang dapat saya harapkan dari situasi buntu yang dipenuhi dengan kemarahan di lingkungan sekitar saya berada dan menghirup udara?


***

Harapan itulah yang membuat saya ingin ikut upaya rekonsiliasi yang kemudian dijuluki sebagai “BakuBae”. Undangan kepada saya disampaikan Oktober 2000 pada saat keadaan konflik di Maluku masih sedang genting. Peristiwa bentrok kekerasan di Kampung Ponegoro dan Fardes di jalan Antoni Rebok, keduanya di kota Ambon, baru saja terjadi. Ratusan nyawa melayang sia-sia, baik Muslim maupun Kristen. Keponakan saya sendiri tertembak dan tewas dalam peristiwa kekerasan Fardes. Saya dalam keadaan marah. Waktu itu saya masih dipercaya menjadi kepala pasukan “Huamoal” dari desa Luhu, Seram, yang sedang bertugas memperkuat pertahanan masyarakat Muslim di kota Ambon yang terus terdesak. Konflik dan bentrok masih saja berkecamuk di sana-sini.

Menanggapi undangannya, saya katakan pada Abdullah Ely, “Tidak bisa! Kondisi masih kacau begini, kalian undang saya untuk berdamai? Apa maksudnya?” Serta merta sebenarnya saya spontan menolak. Dalam situasi kacau itu, undangan rekonsi-liasi tadi terasa omong kosong saja. Mana mungkin orang diajak berdamai, jika keadaan masih sangat tertutup, komunikasi macet, masing-masing pihak hanya berpikir bagaimana menyerang dan memperta-hankan diri. Kata “damai” atau istilah sopannya “rekonsiliasi” jadi langsung terasa “mengandung tipuan”. Bagaimana orang bisa percaya? Saya tidak percaya. Ratusan orang terbunuh di depan mata kepala saya sendiri, dan saya sendiri pun harus mempertahankan diri, ketika serangan itu datang tiba-tiba. Setidaknya, jika kata-kata saya tidak dipercaya, saya sangat meragukan kegunaan pertemuan untuk melerai pertikaian dan selisih pandang di Maluku yang sudah menelan darah dan nyawa orang-orang yang saya cintai.
Tapi Abdullah Ely tampak tak putus asa. “Bagaimana pun kamu harus ikut,” katanya kepada saya, mendesak lagi, sambil menegaskan pentingnya pertemuan itu karena saya adalah kepala pasukan Huamoal. Justru alasannya itu menambah keraguan saya. Memang saya tidak sampai mencurigainya menjadi pengkhianat, karena memang kami pernah lama bekerja sama di organisasi mahasiswa. Tapi, tanggung jawab yang diberikan kepada saya sebagai kepala pasukan membuat saya semakin mengeras dalam posisi tidak percaya.

Ely berusaha mencari alasan lain dan membujuk saya lagi. Dia katakan saya adalah kepala pasukan “yang paling terpelajar” dan karenanya harus ikut serta. Tapi saya hanya tertawa, merasa itu alasan aneh. Konflik di Maluku sudah jadi semacam “konflik semesta”. Semua orang terlibat dan dipaksa jadi terlibat, tak peduli terpelajar atau tidak terpelajar. Guru, dosen, sampai profesor di perguruan tinggi tersohor di Maluku pun sulit membantah dirinya “terlibat”. Kalau tak mau disebut “terlibat”, setidaknya sulit ambil sikap untuk menyatakan tanggung jawab sosialnya, berbalikan dengan tingginya dan martabat jabatan dan profesi mereka.

Tapi terus-terang ikut kegiatan yang agak bergengsi, mendekat-dekat dengan persoalan luas masyarakat di Maluku, sebagai bagian dari negeri yang sangat luas Indonesia yang kini sedang dilanda krisis ini, membawa daya tarik juga. Apalagi kegiatan itu akan dilaksanakan di Bali dan mengangkat topik yang mengarah pada penyelesaian Maluku. Karenanya saya pikir, ya kenapa tidak dicoba dulu. Barangkali ada hasilnya. Kalau tidak menghasilkan apa-apa, ya setidaknya saya pikir saya sudah ikut menyumbangkan sesuatu.

Saya sendiri masih bimbang kalau sekedar hanya ikut-ikutan “menyumbangkan sesuatu”, hanya karena yang lain juga melakukan hal yang sama. Jangan-jangan tak ada bedanya dengan peribahasa “membuang garam ke laut”, suatu usaha yang tidak ada hasilnya sama sekali. Lalu untuk apa? Bukankah sudah banyak upaya yang disebut-sebut sebagai “rekonsiliasi” itu. Masyarakat Maluku sudah jadi semakin tak percaya dengan usaha-usaha semacam itu yang buntutnya malah hanya memperpahit kekacauan yang sudah getir bagi kami ini.

Setelah kerusuhan pertama sudah dibentuk tim rekonsiliasi di antara para pemuka agama dan masyarakat. Pihak Muslim, Kristen Protestan dan Kristen Katolik, datang bersama-sama, sudah diminta untuk mengkhotbahi umat baik di masjid maupun di gereja. Tokoh masyarakat Muslim Yusuf Ely, pendeta Semmy Titaley, uskup PC Mandagi sudah bergerak dari satu masjid ke gereja lainnya untuk mendesak agar menghentikan kegiatan serang-menyerang. Tapi toh sia-sia. Masyarakat Maluku sudah tidak mau dikhotbahi dengan cara sepihak seperti itu. Itu cara-cara yang jelas sudah tak berguna. Lalu “rekonsiliasi” apa pula yang ditawari sobatku Abdullah ini?

Lain kali ada usaha dari pihak pemerintah daerah provinsi Maluku. Perdamaian Masyarakat Maluku oleh Pemda Maluku yang dihadiri oleh Panglima TNI Wiranto. Di situ sekali lagi hadir tokoh-tokoh agama, kepala desa, kepala pemuda, wakil kelompok etnis Buton, Bugis, Makassar, Toraja, Batak, Jawa, dll. Para wakil diandaikan mewakili “semua unsur masyarakat”. Tentu maksudnya adalah sudah sekalian ditanggung pasti pertikaian dan bentrok yang mengikutinya dapat berhenti. Wah pokoknya tampak seru. Lalu tanpa ada proses deliberasi yang mendalam dan jujur serta terbuka, mereka diminta alias dipaksa menandatangani “surat perdamaian” di hadapan sang jenderal Panglima Tentara Indonesia tadi. Yah, jelas mereka takut untuk tidak menandatangani-nya, kalau kita andaikan ada yang tak setuju. Jendral bintang empat turun membuat para penandatangan tak bisa menolak. Penandatanganan dilakukan di lapangan Merdeka, Ambon, sementara masyarakat menonton kegiatan di lapangan, para wakil di panggung menandatangani surat perdamaian yang kosong.

Kali lain ada kejadian yang lebih lucu lagi. Obor Perdamaian. Kenapa lucu? Karena aslinya kegiatan ini adalah kampanye pro-pemerintah Orde Baru dengan tokoh pahlawan mereka Pattimura alias Thomas Matulessy. Sebuah estafet obor dari desa ke desa. Lalu demi usaha “perdamaian” yang masih diragukan itu, mereka menempelkan begitu saja kata “Perdamaian” ganti “Pattimura”. Tentu sebenarnya kasihan nama Pattimura, diganti begitu saja seenaknya. Pattimura sendiri sebenarnya bukan tokoh perdamaian tapi tokoh perang kemerdekaan. Parang salawaku bukanlah simbol penghentian kekerasan, bentrok dan serang-menyerang. Usaha ini dilaksanakan oleh Pemda Provinsi. Ini gagasan janggal dengan membawa oper-mengoper sebuah obor kepahlawanan dilakukan oleh masing-masing pemuda, berlari, dari menyerahkannya kepada para pemuda desa lain yang telah menunggu. Obor dioper-oper dari pulau Saparua, menyeberang selat menuju ke Tulehu di pulau Ambon melewati desa-desa Suli, Passo, Lateri, Halong, Galala, Tantui, Batumerah dan akhirnya Mardika. Tapi, dasar semangat pemuda di tengah kekacauan, tak mampu membendung semangat yang masih diwarnai pertikaian tak terlerai, membuat suasana serah-menyerah obor antara Batumerah dan Mardika tak terkendali dan pecah bentrok bersenjata.

Ketiga jenis “usaha rekonsiliasi” ini membuat saya tak percaya. Karena toh nanti akan sia-sia. Jadi saya tanyakan sekali lagi pada sobat saya yang terhormat Abdullah. “Lalu yang ikut kegiatan itu siapa siapa saja?” Abdullah menjawab bahwa pertemuan yang sedang dia tawarkan ini berbeda dari contoh-contoh tadi. Yang sudah-sudah dilakukan oleh para elit dan dengan cara yang keliru, menganggap masyarakat bodoh dan tidak mengikutsertakan mereka di dalam proses secara sungguh-sungguh, katanya lagi.

Yang ditawarkannya berbeda karena yang diundang ternyata bukanlah orang-orang elit yang diperdaya oleh elit lainnya lagi dari Jakarta. Jenis-jenis ang diundang adalah kepala desa adat, tokoh agama, kepala pemuda, pimpinan perang, koordinator pengungsi, mahasiswa dan kalangan lembaga swadaya masyarakat. Satu unsur yang sama dengan model-model sebelumnya adalah hadirnya tokoh agama. Memang kerusuhan Maluku sudah sedemikian ditempeli dengan cap agama. Tokoh-tokoh agama berada dalam posisi sulit. Karena kecuali “dipakai”, mereka juga “digunakan”. Hadirnya kalangan-kalangan yang selama ini tak diperhitungkan membuat saya berpikir ulang. Ini pendekatan yang berbeda. Memang. Barangkali ada sesuatu yang baru dari jenis pertemuan yang satu ini. Maka saya merasa tampaknya ada sesuatu yang bisa diharapkan lebih daripada yang sudah-sudah.

Ada beberapa jenis unsur masyarakat yang langsung berhubungan dengan saya. Di antaranya termasuk yang diajak ikut serta adalah kepala desa, kepala adat, kepala pemuda, dan tokoh agama. Pertama, kepala desa, dialah yang bertanggung-jawab atas pengiriman pasukan yang dia percayakan pada saya. Kedua, kepala adat, dialah yang memberikan pengesahan atas pengangkatan saya sebagai kepala pasukan dan atas pembentukan pasukan secara adat. Desa kami masih menganut kepercayaan yang mengacu pada warisan leluhur berupa kerajaan Huamual yang dulu pernah dihancurkan oleh para pedagang bersenjata Portugis di abad XVI. Kendati sudah pernah dihancurkan, tapi semangat adat ini masih tetap bertahan sampai sekarang. Ketiga, kepala pemuda karena dialah yang memberikan dukungan moral kepada kepala pasukan. Keempat, tokoh agama, karena dia membaca doa keselamatan pada acara pengangkatan saya sebagai kepala pasukan. Tugas yang diperintahkan kepada saya atas pengesahan adat itu jelas sekali: memimpin pasukan, dia jadi komandan, yang memberi perintah untuk penyerang atau bertahan. Di bawah tangan dan perintah saya adalah 165 orang yang terdiri dari para pendaftar atas pemberitahuan di mana dinyatakan keniscayaan moral membela saudara-saudara sesama beragama Islam yang sedang terdesak di kota Ambon.

Lebih dari itu, keempat orang tadi telah berembug bersama menentukan penentuan diri saya sebagai kepala pasukan. Dalam kaitan dengan akutnya kekacauan Maluku, keempat peran masyarakat adat itu menjadi begitu penting. Kegentingan kekacauan mengisyaratkan kepada mereka untuk bersiaga tingkat paling nol, tidak hanya siaga satu. Secara khusus tokoh agama, yang dalam hal perpolitikan di Indonesia ini selalu jadi bulan-bulanan dan bersikap ganda, juga terus dihantui dan menghantui diri mereka sendiri dengan lukisan imajiner bahwa “selama ini agama kita diserang, maka kita harus membela agama, bukankah kerusuhan ini diatasnamakan agama ..” Agama sudah jauh sekali dipereteli, dibikin tak berdaya, dan masyarakat adat pun dipaksa ikut terseret ke dalam kekerasan dan kekelaman, darah dan anti-kemanusiaan.

Sedangkan kepala pemuda juga memberikan dukungan moral kepada saya. Dukungan itu penting untuk saya. Saya merasa sedang berhadapan dengan pembelaan dan pertahanan diri karena solidaritas dan martabat yang terjepit. Terdengar, dikabarkan dan saya rasakan betapa selama empat bulan sejak awal kerusuhan Januari 1999 sampai April 1999, warga Muslim dijadikan objek kekerasan. Bulan Juli 1999 gelombang bentrok berulang. Sementara pendapat yang bergentayangan di udara Maluku dipenuhi dengan pengutuban frontal antara Islam dan Kristen. Penciptaan pendapat ini adalah sesuatu yang kemudian saya sadari sudah sampai pada batas yang tak masuk akal. Tapi waktu itu, saya rasakan solidaritas sesama warga beragama Islam tidak mungkin lagi diam saja. Tawaran dan penunjukan menjadi kepala pasukan bagi saya menjadi suatu keniscayaan yang tak perlu dipertanyakan.

Abdullah juga mengatakan pada saya bahwa yang akan hadir dalam perte--muan itu adalah para koordinator pengungsi. Saya merasa bahwa kehadiran mereka untuk berbicara sangatlah penting. Selama ini mereka adalah orang-orang yang tertimpa langsung dampak dan kerugian dari kekacauan dan ambur adul zonder hukum di Maluku, ketika masyarakat dan manusianya sudah tak tahu lagi mana yang benar dan mana yang salah. Para pengungsi itu adalah orang-orang yang tergusur, banyak anggota keluarganya tewas dalam bentrok dan serang-menyerang. Habis harta bendanya. Rumah dan isinya dibakar ludes. Mereka hanya bisa membawa sedikit perlengkapan super penting pergi meninggalkan tempat tinggal asalnya. Keadaan ini dialami oleh kedua belah pihak, baik Muslim maupun Kristen. Mereka menjadi manusia-manusia yang terlunta-lunta bahkan di negeri-negeri dan tanah mereka sendiri.

Tapi mereka pulalah orang-orang yang dipenuhi dengan dendam sekaligus orang-orang yang hilang akal mau berbuat apa ketika semuanya terjungkir balik. Mereka adalah orang-orang yang memiliki kemendesakan keperluan untuk diberi penjelasan efektif yang meyakinkan tentang apa yang terjadi dalam perspektif penghormatan terhadap hidup mereka sendiri. Banyak pertanyaan yang tak sampai sungguh jadi pertanyaan dalam benak mereka ketika mereka mati sia-sia karena semangat dendam yang mereka rasakan harus disalurkan.

Memang, tak ada orang yang dapat memahami sesehat-sehat dan sekuat-kuat kesadaran siapa pun yang pernah merasa dirinya jadi manusia, ketika mereka perlu bertanya mengapa mereka sampai terusir dari rumah dan kampung mereka. Orang tak tahu apa persoalannya dan duduk perkaranya, tahu-tahu sudah harus dipaksa tinggal di barak pengungsian. Tentu belakangan mereka terpaksa menyadari bahwa mereka tidak dapat menerima, sekaligus tidak puas dan marah atas kerugian yang mereka rasakan dan mereka alami.

Mereka merasa perlu “sekedar” membalas dan melampiaskan dengan tindakan yang setidaknya sama nilainya dengan yang mereka alami, baik harta maupun nyawa. Darah ganti darah. Nyawa ganti nyawa. Dan rumah ganti rumah. Apa yang dapat dikatakan? Kesia-siaan. Itulah. Akankah kita membiarkan mereka terjungkal tenggelam dalam kekelaman. Ini harus dihentikan, kalau orang masih punya akal sehat. Sementara jumlah mereka mencapai ratusan ribu, di tengah-tengah keseimbangan kependudukan Maluku yang sangat sedikit. Hanya tiga juta! Satu juta di kawasan kesatuan etnis Ambon-Lease. Seluruh timbangan demografi Maluku sudah bergeser, kaki jadi kepala dan kepala jadi kaki.

Menyadari semuanya ini, sobat saya Abdullah sendiri menyadari sepenuhnya kebuntuan yang kami hadapi bersama-sama menyangkut keadaan di Maluku. Karenanya dia juga cepat bisa menangkap apa yang bisa jadi menarik untuk saya. “Nanti di sana ose bisa mengungkapkan apa yang mengganjal di hatimu,” katanya melanjutkan usahanya menjanjikan apa yang bisa diperoleh dari pertemuan itu. Butir inilah yang masih menarik untuk saya. Begitu banyak hal yang ingin saya ungkapkan. Dan memang saya akui, saya sendiri punya banyak ganjalan dan pengalaman lembar hitam selama kerusuhan, sehingga memang selayaknya merasa harus secara terbuka menyatakan uneg-uneg kepada pihak-pihak yang saya bayangkan bersangkutan agar dapat dibicarakan untuk dicarikan jalan keluar. Insya`allah, itu ada. Waktu itu saya berharap bahwa dengan penentuan pihak-pihak yang benar-benar “tidak hanya bersifat representatif”, tapi sekaligus juga mempertimbangkan kepentingan mereka yang paling menderita, akan memberikan langkah-langkah awal untuk memenuhi apa yang dirindukan oleh para korban. Mereka meminta dan mendesak agar semuanya didudukkan pada tempatnya dengan akal sehat dan sikap bertanggung jawab. Itulah harapan saya waktu itu ketika diajak ikut serta dalam proses bicara dari hati ke hati yang kemudian disebut dengan “BakuBae”.***

Klik juga yang berikut ini:

MEDIA INDONESIA
http://www.thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid=20020601.C03
http://www.kompas.com/kompas-cetak/0109/08/nasional/perl08.htm
http://www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/nasional/2002/04/29/brk,20020429-35,id.html
http://www.media-indonesia.com/beritakhusus.asp?Id=502&cat=&IdBerita=&Judul=&Type=&LNav=RA
http://www.sinarharapan.co.id/berita/0205/08/sh05.html
http://www.indomedia.com/bernas/052002/01/UTAMA/01uta3.htm

SURAT KABAR INTERNATIONAL
http://krant.telegraaf.nl/krant/vandaag/teksten/bui.molukken.leger.geweld.html

WEBSITE NGO
http://www.infid.be/sno171-040513.html
http://www.religionandpolicy.org/show.php?p=1.1.1147

INTERNATIONAL WEBNEWS
http://www.insideindonesia.org/edit82/edit82_p15.html

JARINGAN TRANSKONFLIK INTERNASIONAL
http://www.transnational.org/forum/meet/2002/SathaAnand_Conflict.html

WEBSITE KEAGAMAAN INTERNASIONAL
http://www.asianews.it/view_p.php?l=it&art=757

“Kerukunan dalam Perbedaan”

Vesti virum facit.


1. Proses duduk berbicara dan berproses bersama
Penyelesaian masalah bentrok-bentrok yang (kemudian) diatasnamakan komunitas beragama atau latar belakang krusial yang lain tidak akan dapat diraih seketika. Dibutuhkan proses yang panjang, tapi juga tak terelakkan perlunya mengambil langkah jangka dekat. Yang paling penting adalah bagaimana membangun kerangka dan suasana para pihak yang berkepentingan selayaknya duduk berbicara dan berproses bersama secara bertahap serta satu sama lain memegang komitmen untuk tetap melanjutkan proses komunikasi terbuka.

2. Pilihan strategi kerukunan dan pembangunan
Dalam hal ini, pilihan strategi yang paling mendasar adalah mengutamakan para pihak yang paling dirugikan dalam praktik hidup sosial politik dalam masyarakat. Pilihan ini menjadi lebih genting lagi tingkat kepentingannya jika diterapkan di daerah-daerah konflik. Kepekaan dan rasa prihatin dari pihak-pihak yang ada di tingkat pusat sangat diharapkan. Berbagai bentuk pengaturan dan perundangan yang sentralistik serta sepihak telah terbukti lebih banyak mempersulit perkembangan dan pembangunan masyarakat yang sesungguhnya. Jika masyarakat tidak merasakan kepekaan minimum yang diharap-kan, masyarakat umumnya "akan jalan sendiri", sekalipun pemerintah "mengatur".

3. Jaminan sukses mengatasi kerawanan sosial
Indonesia telah tergolong sebagai kawasan "potensial konflik" karena krisis berkepanjangan sejak terjadi pergantian rejim 1998. Di daerah-daerah potensi itu malah telah meledak. Fakta berbagai bentrok berdarah dan kehancuran sosial itu, apa pun latarbelakangnya, selayaknya membuka pilihan strategi penyelesaian konflik dan pembangunan masyarakat menuju preferensi dasar kinerja para pihak yang berkepentingan dengan pendekatan “dari bawah”, berwawasan dari para pihak yang paling dirugikan. Kehancuran masyarakat di kawasan-kawasan konflik sudah membuka mata hati siapa saja untuk tidak perlu meragukan pilihan strategi ini, karena pendekatan ini sudah sampai pada tingkat “tidak terelakkan“.

4. Prasyarat dasar hidup bersama dalam perbedaan dalam masyarakat
Perbedaan apa pun bentuknya, entah agama, etnik, pilihan politik, warna kulit, jenis kelamin, dsb. adalah fakta yang tak terbantahkan di mana pun manusia berada dan hidup. Perbedaan menjadi masalah sosial dan politik, bahkan (mendorong terjadinya) bentrok-bentrok berdarah, jika kondisi yang memungkinkan perbedaan itu difahami bersama sebagai fakta sosial yang normal dan wajar tidak diselenggarakan bersama secara memadai. Pengalaman konflik berdarah berdasarkan agama dan etnik di Indonesia telah membuktikannya. Setidaknya terdapat beberapa pokok yang menjadi prasyarat/kondisi/jamin-an yang dibutuhkan manusia yang berbeda-beda untuk dapat hidup bersama secara aktif.

a) Prakondisi kerukunan:
Pendidikan dasar yang berorientasi pada kemandirian pribadi dan akal budi manusia bersama dengan komunitas-komunitasnya; pendidikan agama mendorong pada pencapai-an prasyarat ini.
Kekuatan-kekuatan anti-kerukunan:
Kebodohan sebagai akibat dari proses marginalisasi masyarakat secara sistematis dalam jangka waktu yang lama

b) Prakondisi kerukunan:
Komunikasi terbuka di antara para pihak dalam masyarakat yang dikembangkan secara kelembagaan dalam lingkup sosial dan politik
Kekuatan-kekuatan anti-kerukunan:
Korupsi, instabilitas keamanan, kepemim-inan yang lemah, konflik antarelit politik-militer, birokrasi sebagai tangan implementasi ideologis; over-politisasi agama

c) Prakondisi kerukunan:
Penyelenggaraan hidup sosial dan ekonomi yang adil; program-program ekonomi yang konkret
Kekuatan-kekuatan anti-kerukunan:
Senjang sosial ekonomi, kemiskinan, masalah ekonomi makro

d) Prakondisi kerukunan:
Perlindungan bagi hak-hak sipil dan politik, ekonomi, sosial dan budaya dari semua individu dalam masyarakat
Kekuatan-kekuatan anti-kerukunan:
Diskriminasi sosial, agama, etnik, ras


5. “Mewaspadai perbeda-an”
Jika prasyarat-prasyarat dasar ini dipenuhi, tidak akan condong muncul kekhawatiran dari siapa pun sehingga perlu “mewaspadai” perbedaan. “Mewaspadai perbedaan” justru menjadi suatu ungkapan yang kontradiksi pada dirinya sendiri. Warga masyarakat yang terlalu mendahulukan “sikap waspada” akan mengerdilkan dirinya sendiri. Sebab, perbedaan bukanlah pertama-tama harus diwaspadai, tapi selayaknya diterima dan dikembangkan secara memadai dalam lingkup hidup sosial, hukum, dan politik yang mengembangkan pribadi masing-masing warga masyarakat. Perbedaan tidak cukup hanya diakui, tapi perlu diamini, disyukuri, dikembangkan menjadi identitas (pribadi & komunitas) yang sifatnya terbuka. Karenanya, perbedaan dan kekhawatiran (terutama pada tingkat komunitas) sangat perlu dikomunikasikan, dibicarakan, dijadikan ajang pendidikan pribadi dan masyarakat secara terbuka. Sejauh komunikasi sosial yang memadai dapat dikembangkan, kekhawatiran terhadap kerawanan sosial dan politik dapat dilerai, ancaman dapat ditangkal dan diubah menjadi tantangan bersama.

6. Tujuan hidup rukun, saling pengertian, saling menghormati
Komponen-komponen masyarakat yang berbeda-beda, tapi hidup dengan rukun, saling pengertian dan saling menghormati adalah tujuan dan sasaran umum dari cita-cita masyarakat itu secara bersama-sama. Tujuan mulia ini bukanlah ada pada dirinya sendiri dari manusia dan masyarakat manusia yang berbeda-beda tersebut. Tujuan mulia yang jadi usang karena terlalu sering dipakai, sementara dalam kenyataan jadi sangat rentan, hanya dapat dicapai dengan cara menjalani proses bersama. Memperluas pilihan-pilihan berbasis komunitas bersama di luar jalur dan ruang resmi yang sudah buntu perlu terus dicari dan diupayakan. Peluang-peluang yang ada tidaklah sesempit seperti kebanyakan orang mencemaskannya. Dalam hal ini, kebersamaan, komunikasi, deliberasi dan negosiasi menjadi prioritas dalam menempuh proses mencapai tujuan tersebut. Ketika proses tersebut dipatahkan melulu demi “tujuan”, atau “tujuan” tersebut belum teruji dalam dan oleh proses, maka kesalingan dan perbedaan dalam proses tidak mendapatkan jaminan keberadaannya. Ancaman kerawanan sosial timbul.

7. Program-program bersama yang terasa dampaknya secara langsung
Agama-agama dan iman yang dihayati memiliki paradoks yang sifatnya membantu tapi juga dapat mengganggu. Dalam upaya menuju tujuan berproses hidup rukun dalam perbedaan, paradoks ini perlu diangkat menjadi tantangan yang mendorong para pihak dalam masyarakat menemukan rentang pilihan kegiatan “kebersamaan” (common ground) yang sifatnya konkret, terasa dampak positifnya secara langsung (tangible), tidak hanya sekedar bermakna simbolik, namun sekaligus juga mengangkat harkat kemanusiaan dan kedamaian batin yang mendalam. Hanya dengan sikap mendasar dalam menghayati iman secara mendalam para pihak yang berbeda-beda mampu terus mencari dan menemukan titik temu. Secara mendasar “agama” tidaklah hanya yang mengacu pada yang resmi (diakui), tapi juga penghayatan nilai-nilai kemanusiaan secara universal, tak peduli apa pun keyakinan mereka. Pada gilirannya, berbagai mitos yang menyesatkan, dalam ruang sosial keagamaan dan politik, seperti dikotomi mayoritas-minoritas, perbedaan sebagai ancaman, kebodohan dan ketertutupan karena salah didik, dsb. dapat diatasi oleh para pihak itu sendiri dalam proses sosial secara bersama-sama.

7. Pemerintah yang kompeten
Masyarakat berhak memiliki dan menentukan pemerintah yang kompeten, artinya memiliki kemampuan (setidaknya mampu/mau terus belajar dari pengalaman) untuk melayani masyarakat secara memadai. Kecondongan untuk “mengatur” tanpa menghiraukan apa kepentingan dasar hidup dalam perbedaan justru akan memundurkan kemampuan masyarakat untuk menangani masalah-masalah yang tidak dapat dijangkau oleh pemerintah. Pemerintah dituntut untuk menjadi “fasilitator”, artinya memudah hidup masyarakat, bukan “imperator” yang memerintah secara sepihak. Pemerintah dituntut tidak hanya untuk memahami aspirasi dasar masyarakat seumumnya, tapi juga berkompeten mewujudkan saluran-saluran aspirasi masyarakat secara terbuka. Proses-proses deliberasi bersama dengan para pihak (tidak hanya melalui sistem politik yang diakui, tapi juga yang tak terjangkau oleh sistem namun nyata ada dan hidup dalam masyarakat) selayaknya lebih diutamakan dan lebih dikembangkan.***

Konflik Laten di Maluku dan Potensinya untuk Ditunggangi

(Tulisan pendek di bawah ini diterbitkan dalam rubrik Fokus dari harian Kompas, Sabtu, 01 Mei 2004, tak lama berselang setelah kerusuhan di Ambon meledak lagi setelah tanggal 25 April 2004.)



KEKACAUAN di Kota Ambon, Provinsi Maluku, meletus kembali dalam skala yang lebih kurang mirip dengan situasi ketika kebijakan darurat sipil diterapkan tahun 2000. Penanganannya sangat bergantung pada pemahaman para pihak tentang kondisi laten konflik Maluku dan tentang kerentanannya untuk ditunggangi pihak-pihak lain, sementara tokoh masyarakat yang sedang memperjuangkan perdamaian sendiri pada masa pascadarurat sipil ini belum lagi tuntas menyelesaikan tugas-tugas mereka membangun perekat sosial yang paling minimal.

TENTU keadaan yang bagaikan mundur kembali ke saat awal kerusuhan Ambon ini sangat mengecewakan masyarakat, terutama para pemuka dan pekerja perdamaian yang berbulan-bulan menekuni proses menjahit kembali jalinan sosial, ekonomi, dan budaya yang terobek-robek. Sungguh sulit diterima bahwa ribuan pengungsi yang perlahan-lahan telah kembali ke tempat-tempat relokasi, bahkan tempat asal mereka, kini kembali kocar-kacir, terlunta-lunta, di negeri-negeri mereka sendiri.


Persoalan laten

Kurun pascakonflik yang sedianya sudah berlangsung setelah darurat sipil dicabut September 2003 menyodorkan berbagai persoalan laten yang masih mengendap di dasar kesadaran masyarakat Maluku. Konflik yang meledak lagi di Ambon bermula dari isu pihak aparat keamanan membiarkan reli menyambut peristiwa ulang tahun Front Kedaulatan Maluku sebagai penampilan depan dari klaim separatisme Republik Maluku Selatan (RMS).

Kelompok anti-RMS, dengan mengemukakan klaim nasionalistis merah-putih, sudah mengancam balik akan menyerang sehari sebelum kekerasan merebak. Suatu kejadian yang tampaknya tak cukup diantisipasi oleh aparat keamanan ternyata meledak secara mendadak dan bergulung-gulung, seolah-olah tak tersangka-sangka sebelumnya, berubah menjadi kekacauan dalam skala besar-puluhan orang tewas, ratusan rumah dibakar, kantor-kantor perwakilan pekerjaan kemanusiaan internasional dikaitkan dengan khayalan dukungan terhadap salah satu pihak.

Namun, jika ditilik lebih jauh lagi ketimbang isu sedangkal permukaan, terdapat suatu polarisasi yang pelik pada tingkat masyarakat. Dari survei menjelang masa pascakonflik yang diselenggarakan Tim Baku Bae, Maret-April 2002, persoalan isu separatisme (34,2 persen) berhadapan langsung dengan isu konflik elite politik, yang terbagi secara kontras antara 73 persen kelompok Kristen dan 11,6 persen Islam.

Dari kecondongan terbelahnya masyarakat berdasarkan polarisasi isu yang mencuat ke permukaan ini tampak jelas bahwa isu separatisme yang dipersepsikan sebagai sesuatu yang "besar" dan karenanya dilebih-lebihkan di Maluku ini memiliki suatu dimensi yang sama sekali berbeda jika dibandingkan dengan separatisme di Aceh atau Papua, misalnya.

Separatisme Aceh sudah sampai ke taraf TNI sendiri terpaksa blakblakan membuka jalan penanganan militer. Di Maluku, di mana pada tingkat publik TNI masih bersikap persuasif, klaim separatisme yang ada hampir-hampir melulu didukung oleh para pemuda (kebetulan Kristen, tapi secara umum dulu ada pula dari kalangan Muslim) menganggur. Sementara keadaan para pendukung anti-RMS pun tak jauh berbeda.


Preferensi pencegahan

Meskipun polarisasi isu ini sudah kronis sifatnya dalam sejarah Maluku sejak kemerdekaan Republik Indonesia, selisih pandangan ini bukanlah suatu keniscayaan bahwa potensi konflik yang masih laten itu tidak dapat dilerai. Upaya pencegahan sebenarnya merupakan strategi yang paling tepat untuk mengendurkan polarisasi isu yang secara aktual memang sensitif dan sekaligus dapat ditunggangi oleh pihak-pihak luar yang tidak bertanggung jawab.

Belajar dari proses transformasi konflik Maluku, polarisasi isu bukanlah suatu hal yang tidak dapat dibahas dan ditangani oleh orang-orang Maluku sendiri. Namun, haruslah diakui bahwa proses rekonsiliasi yang selama ini telah dilakukan untuk Maluku belum sampai tuntas menyentuhnya dalam suatu proses bertahap dan terus-menerus digarap baik di tingkat atas maupun di tingkat publik.

Penanganan tahap menengah adalah secara cepat dan setidaknya mulai mengubah dan mengorientasikan para pendukung muda dari masing-masing isu ini menjadi tenaga kerja minimal. Jika tidak, risikonya adalah isu banal ini diangkat-angkat jadi isu publik yang panas dan dapat ditunggangi menjadi sangat besar.

Mutlaknya memperhatikan program penanganan kaum muda yang menganggur di daerah konflik adalah salah satu kunci utamanya. Hal ini didukung oleh hasil awal dari penelitian terhadap konflik komunal di India, Srilanka, Nigeria, dan Malaysia yang dilakukan oleh Ashutosh Varsney yang sedang meneliti konflik-konflik komunal di Indonesia. Dibandingkan dengan konflik komunal yang terjadi di empat negara tersebut, kata profesor telaah etnis dari Universitas Michigan, Amerika Serikat, ini, konflik komunal yang di banyak tempat dimulai oleh keterlibatan dan pertikaian antar-anak muda adalah ciri sangat khas yang hanya terdapat di Indonesia.

Penanganan tahap jangka panjang dalam proses rekonsiliasi kiranya akan terkait dengan dimensi pendidikan sipil untuk masyarakat, terutama pada bidang pendidikan formal. Pendidikan terbuka melibatkan kelompok-kelompok berbeda yang menekankan hak-hak sipil dalam konteks kemasyarakatan dan politik lokal seumumnya kiranya merupakan hal sentral.


Konflik antarpenembak jitu

Kekacauan di Ambon yang terjadi mulai Minggu 25 April sampai sekarang ini memiliki dimensi peranan aktor-aktornya yang sudah sangat berbeda ketimbang yang sebelumnya muncul di permukaan. Eskalasi yang cepat membuat masyarakat bertanya-tanya ada apa gerangan sebelumnya. Banyak warga masyarakat biasa, baik Muslim maupun Kristen, tidak mengerti bagaimana semuanya bisa terjadi begitu cepat dan fatal, ketika ratusan rumah dan kantor-kantor pekerja kemanusiaan internasional jadi sasaran.

Barangkali yang bergulung-gulung kemudian terjadi sudah lebih jelas tidak bisa lagi disebut sebagai "kerusuhan" biasa yang cepat dapat ditangani, tetapi gamblang sebuah kegiatan "serang-menyerang" yang selama ini senantiasa ditutup-tutupi dari ruang publik. Misalnya, "kegiatan menembak dengan peralatan senjata canggih dari tempat terlindung" (persisnya bukanlah "tersembunyi" karena banyak orang sudah tahu di mana asal dan jangkauannya) bukanlah kegiatan warga masyarakat biasa, melainkan justru mengorbankan masyarakat biasa seumumnya.

Fakta adanya para penembak jitu tersembunyi ini belum pernah diangkat ke permukaan publik. Padahal, belajar dari konflik-konflik yang terjadi di Ambon dalam waktu empat tahun setelah Januari 1999, hal yang sama pernah berbulan-bulan berlangsung di Kota Ambon dan sekitarnya. Namun, sekarang media mengangkatnya sebagai sesuatu yang jelas di depan mata. Sengketa dengan senjata api telak yang terjadi di Ambon sebenarnya sama sekali bukan hal baru. Namun, pengangkatannya ke ruang publik ini penting karena memang layak menjadi sasaran perhatian masyarakat untuk mendesak pihak berwewenang, terutama polisi, untuk bersikap lebih jujur dan lebih seimbang dengan kepercayaan yang telah diberikan oleh masyarakat untuk menjamin keamanan publik.


Tumpang tindih

Dalam pertikaian fisik bersenjata tajam atau bersenjata api, kiranya terjadi serang-menyerang yang tumpang tindih, saling mendukung sekaligus mengaburkan pihak masing-masing yang berkonflik.

Pertama adalah desakan dan dukungan tidak langsung dari masing-masing kekuatan bersenjata yang berkonflik kepada warga masyarakat umumnya-kaum muda yang umumnya bingung mencari pekerjaan itu-untuk menyerang pihak lain yang dipersepsikan sebagai "musuh" dari masing-masing pihak dan dipermudah dengan adanya pengecapan konfesi agama.

Kedua, yang terjadi adalah juga tembak-menembak di antara para penembak jitu itu sendiri. Barangkali titik paling panas dalam keseimbangan konflik yang penuh ketegangan inilah yang masih berlangsung. Sejauh konflik antarpenembak jitu ini masih terus bertahan, ketegangan dalam masyarakat akan jadi sangat sulit diredakan.

Ketiga, masyarakat, baik yang Muslim maupun Kristen, setiap saat bisa jadi sasaran yang sungguh-sungguh tidak berperikemanusiaan, dan karenanya sekaligus juga tidak masuk akal. Soalnya, untuk menimbulkan ketegangan yang dapat membantu meningkatkan perlindungan dan pengaburan seraya terus bertahan baik untuk si penembak jitu maupun untuk kelompoknya, arah laras senapan tidak hanya disasarkan pada pihak lain yang bersenjata, tetapi juga warga masyarakat yang tidak berdosa.

Inilah buruk dan kacaunya "kerusuhan" Ambon yang nyata sudah berubah menjadi kegiatan "serang-menyerang" antara kelompok-kelompok spesifik yang berkonflik. Konsekuensinya, penanganan oleh pihak polisi yang sedianya menjadi pemegang wewenang keamanan lokasi setempat juga haruslah lebih terfokus dan lebih efisien pada keadaan yang sudah jelas kasatmata. Hal ini jelas berisiko, termasuk tewasnya anggota-anggota aparat keamanan yang bersungguh-sungguh atau yang baru saja datang ke lokasi konflik dan kurang waspada, seperti telah terjadi dengan meninggalnya setidaknya dua orang Brigade Mobil, Senin (26/4).

Secara spesifik pihak yang berwewenang wajib menangani kejahatan ini, siapa pun pelakunya, termasuk jika aparat keamanan itu sendiri, "dapat memiliki keterikatan emosional" (seperti sudah sering diakui oleh para pemimpin mereka; lihat juga foto-foto di halaman depan media cetak 28 April) tidak hanya terhadap masing-masing kelompoknya, tapi terutama malah kepentingan politik dan ekonomi mereka yang ada di belakang.

Netralitas sikap aparat keamanan bagaimanapun adalah syarat mutlak bagi keberhasilan penanganan masalah Ambon karena sudah bukan rahasia lagi di masyarakat: perlengkapan keamanan itu diperjualbelikan secara gelap atau pernah dijebol dari gudang-gudang senjata resmi.


PRASETYOHADI Pemerhati Konflik Etnis dan Mantan Kofasilitator Transformasi Konflik Maluku

Moedrick Sangidu and Mega-Bintang Alliance in 1997 Surakarta, Central Java

Researcher-editor
Prasetyohadi



A. INTRODUCTION
What was the case/process about? What were the actors involved? What happened?)

Moedrick Sangidu's case at Surakarta and its surrounding was about the relative success of a local politician in a district level in Indonesia in framing political actions for creating pressures to the repressive government by the end of President Soeharto's rule, particularly during the electoral period in May 1997. Moedrick, who led the Surakarta chapter of the Islamic-oriented United Development Party (PPP) since 1995, succeeded in taking political opportunity to put forward the interests of the majority of the people in the concerned areas and, particularly and to certain extent, in the Central Java province.

However, Moedrick's involvement in local politics goes back at least when the actor started being active in the party chapter in early 1980s when he initiated his political carrier in the PPP as the internal security division's head. He and his associates found, at least increasingly since early 1990s onwards, that the regime grew and eventually ended up in a devastating performance as materialized in rampant corruption and thereby self-evidences of injustice, which then he easily picked up as the main issues of his political struggle in the local political constellation. There were a tiny but conspicuous yet well-connected rich people in the midst of considerable percentage of poor people in the town and its surroundings, who continuously drew his feeling of compassion towards the latter.

The PPP officials relatively managed to reach a possible process of democratization since the party carried the powerless opposition party to the front line of local political space. The present powerlessness of the party was caused by the government's repression due to the New Order's policy of "floating mass" (no real political power other than the government allowed). After being appointed the regional chairman of the party, Moedrick and his supporters were confirmed to join and therefore prepare the 1997 general election in which they relatively succeeded in managing political issues of injustice and alternately gathering massive rallies during the electoral campaigns. Subsequently, the local chapter gained matching votes to the ruling party of Golkar. They managed to garner coalescent support from the splintered faction of the Indonesian Democratic Party, which was enduring vacant of power after brutal military crackdown in 1996. The result of the ballot shows that the PPP gained 25.18% more as compared to the previous poll in 1992, although it was still nominally lower than the dominant Golkar's vote gain (PPP: 40.06%, Golkar: 56.61%, PDI: 03.33%).

The single actor of democratization process in this case along with supporters was Moedrick Malkan Sangidu, a long-term activist of the PPP, and since early 1995 was appointed chairman of the Surakarta chapter of the party. He played major role in mobilizing local people, larger than his own supporters, towards and during the electoral period in 1997 to gain more votes for the party.


B. The actual political structure (researchers' attempt)

(a) the relative openness or closure of the system

Repressive government of the Soeharto's regime in 1997 had reached the phase of decline. Public performance of the regime's exponents in the governance had been growing into moral decay so far as the public found much open, raging corruption and the government officials' insensitiveness in delineating and implementing public policy in contrast with the people's common sense. The ruling party Golkar and its allies in the local government of Central Java and its direct subordinates had to perform repression through direct measures and worst farcical justification. This development, on the contrary and unexpectedly, generated a significant political openness for the people's participation in public sphere in the local Surakarta level.

Relative closure of the system might be seen in the measures that were taken by the local government or the office of the local government's attorney and the government-controlled judges in the judicial system. They focused the measures on legalistic approaches by overstressing the electoral rules. Harder than that, the government officials, sometime coupled by the ruling party Golkar supporters, reacted against the PPP street actions with similar ones, which then very often resulted in a weakening political effect of the former in the public image.

(b) the relative stability or instability of the alignments among dominating groups constituting the basis for the established polity

The dominating groups that took firm grip of the established polity were mainly the local governments. They consisted of either at the levels of municipality of Surakarta, personalized by Surakarta mayor Hartomo or of the provincial government in the hand of Central Java's flaunting governor Soewardi, who was still an active high-ranked military officer. The political alignment between both was quite obvious as they joined their political forces, along with their subordinates, mostly civil servants, in the bureaucracy in consistently trying to curb any movement from below.

On the other side, there was a sign of instability as the military at the moment was apparently in tension with the local government stemming from strong rivalry between the army and the civilian sections of the government in the province. There were some major reasons to it. First, the military observed that the government was too arrogant and insensitive in dealing with larger people's interest. Yellowization program was one of conspicuous examples of it. Second, the military also showed a sign of discord with the government upon knowing that even Prince Diponegoro statue, the patron symbol of local military command, was painted in yellow as well replacing the military's official color of dark green. Third, the military was quite overwhelmed in dealing with riots flaring up in April 1997 at various locations in Central Java.

However, this apparent instability might be only temporary and relative because it contradicted common supposition that the government was generally supported by the military. The reason is that there was no sign that the government was directly supported by the military. The military was relatively close to Moedrick and his supporters within the party chapter, instead. With apparent friendly demeanor towards Moedrick, the military turned out to be a kind of facilitator of the local opposition movement. So far there had never been any kind of military crackdown against Moedrick's movement.

(c) the possibility for actors to link up with sectors of the élite

Individually, Moedrick was clearly seen to have a relatively strong capability to link up with the élite, partly due to his choice to proceed the struggle within the formal existing political system. He was a close friend of the then local military commander Major General Subagyo H.S. and hence he had the possibility to see how large was the political space for he himself and the people. The local military commander was reported to be present in several local party meetings, that supposed to be exclusive for intern interest. The military was reported to have approved the anti-yellowization movement. Aside from that, Surakarta Major Hartomo was also among the politically reachable people for him in the town to bargain with. Moedrick might have direct and strong bargaining power in front of the mayor.

Moedrick was successful in drawing the press' interests so far as he often appeared in diverse newspapers' headlines. The press may paramountly become the main communicator to the élite, which generated more public pressure against the élite. Moedrick had a relatively stronger moral conduct than the dominating groups in the government and the military. It was because he has captured sense of justice of the party supporters, and of the public at large.

(d) the capacity and propensity of the state in particular to repress actors

The government repeatedly lashed out and curbed the anti-yellowization movements, set by Moedrick and his supporters, however it apparently consisted of only words and occasional measures, so that Moedrick and his party chapter did not shrink. The propensity of the establishment to repress the actor and his supporters and allies apparently was limited to only overstress the electoral rules and their relative measures. Eerily enough, the dominating groups never employed any ideological idea to repress Moedrick's movement, suggesting moral political failure of the establishment.

The government obviously had the propensity to repress the actors and his party officials. They endured several times of the government's intervention, either by terror, intimidation or formal words, however they did not much matter. There are many examples of the government's propensity to repress the actor. To mention a few, the central government of Jakarta, by means of the attorney-general as instructed by the President, along with the military and police officers told local party activists to respect the pre-electoral regulations. The local government's election monitoring commission (Panwaslakda) supported the police's harsh measures towards party activists who broke electoral regulations. Local police several times raided recalcitrant street campaigners breaking the regulations. Moedrick was summoned in relation to an alleged beating towards a government official who pulled out the party's green flags. A beheaded dog with its separate intestines and a knife were once personally sent to Moedrick in May 1997. The government directly banned the seemingly strong coalition between the PPP and local PDI chapter. The information department in Jakarta banned a local bulletin published by the local PPP chapter called "Suara Bintang" in May 1997.


C. THE ACTORS' REAL PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRACY AND THE GENERAL PROCESS OF DEMOCRATISATION
(If actors themselves don't speak up about this, we search for other indicators of their actual perspective. If an actor don't seem to have any perspective on democracy/democratization, we specify this -- and why that is! If so we also discuss why the aims and demands of the actor anyway is part of and contribute to the process of democratization.)

(1) Content
Why does democratization make sense to the actors? That is, what are the actors really out or and why is it, then, that struggle for democratization becomes instrumental?

When asked "what was the deepest idea of his struggle for", Moedrick referred to the struggle towards the welfare of ordinary people living in the region. The democratization, Moedrick said, was for the poor people in general living in the society. How to direct the process of democratization to the destitute was the main focus of his struggle. He said he saw a lot of suffering of ordinary people, whom he met and who came to him to ask for help. He said he was touched personally by poor people beseeching for subsistence and even calling him to solve trivial dispute in the neighborhood. He said they were the very cause of his struggle for gaining more participation in the local politics that relates to "the idea of democracy" or "the process toward democratic society". Concerning it, he also referred to Islamic values that preached the idea of justice as an inspiration of his and the party's struggle in local politics.

Therefore, according to Moedrick, the people, mostly those who supported his cause, demanded a real part of the whole wealth accumulated in the society, as he claimed that most of the people also realized an unequal distribution of the wealth. He maintained, therefore, that distributive justice, so far as elucidated and manifest in the effort to focusing the people's movement towards fair election, was the basic impelling content of his struggle in democratizing the local political system. Since the beginning of his presence in the chapter in the 1970s he started to build his political character as the people defender to show how justice should be carried out. Particularly, when the content of his struggle was applied to the political frames during the electoral period, he coined his idea of democracy to "fairness" of the election.

Concerning Islam as the original orientation of the party, Moedrick took religion-related issues only whenever he thought that political mobilization required them. He stressed that the party does not base on Islam but on the state ideology Pancasila. However, according to him, it will always keep the Islamic image, because he acknowledged that the party was a fusion of several Islamic parties in 1973. Emphasizing a sort of openness of the party, he said, there is a lot of non-Muslims support the party as well, because the Muslims and the non-Muslims have similarity in ideas about justice and democracy. He also said Islam preached the wellbeing of mankind as a whole and not only for the Muslim community. According to him, Islam should be tolerant and Islamic radicalism was no longer relevant in Indonesia. However, he shrewdly said, "People who say «Islam yes, Islamic party no!» do not know what they are saying. They are only trying to corner the PPP."

2. Precondition
What (according to the actors) is necessary to fight and change in order to promote democracy and democratization? What preconditions for democracy and democratization have to be created?

There are some situations that Moedrick demands as preconditions before democracy and democratization could be accomplished:

Distributive justice, in term of social and economic equality, should be first implemented in the whole walks of life of the people. The democracy requests, according to him, that poor and powerless people, who have so far been split up on a religious and political bases, be granted enough wellbeing such as works thereby sufficient income, that they may perform their basic rights in raising their concerns in a given society.

Strengthening the civil society, not necessarily based on Islamic values, but on the accomplishment of minimum relative justice in general. Moedrick maintained that the people in diverse associations in the public should be given enough say in conveying their basic interests and needs, otherwise they would not be able to perform normally their life in public space.

An opening up of the image of the closeness of the party from the merely Islamic values to the idea of justice. Moedrick urges his colleagues in the party chapter to work hard to practice politics for the people in general. He wants his immediate subordinate in the chapter to act as representatives channeling the aspirations of the people.

Creating the image of clean politicians within the party to enhance the further party's performance in the public. The public bad image that formal politicians within the party are thought only seeking a seat and salary in parliament should be gradually scrapped out and replaced by the integrity of the party's activists.

3. Extent
How much should be democratized? That is, what sectors of the country or the locality (with their political, social and economic spheres) do the actors like to democratize?

According to Moedrick, there are some target extents of his movement, which may be delineated into four fields: (1) Mainly the social and political groupings in the range of Surakarta municipality, which will be elaborated in the political inclusion section of this report. (2) Economic sphere, however, constituted a considerable extended sphere to aim at having more share in the public wealth, mostly work fields for the poor but politically potential people, (3) Political institutions within the existing system was partly also the extent of Moedrick's movement, apart from his personal choice not to join the government-approved local council, (4) Larger religious institution was also partly made up a mass based of the Islamic-oriented party of PPP, which mostly came from the Muhammadiyah social and religious grouping as the second larger religion-based organization in Indonesia.


4. Forms
(a) What democracy do the actors prefer? That is, what structures of democracy would the actors like to have?
(b) What general process of democratization do the actors go for? That is, in what way would the actors like the process of democratization to take place?

(a) What democracy do the actors prefer?

(Focusing on the civil society, starting from local Muslims)
According to Moedrick, democracy in future should firstly focus on the strengthening the civil society starting with people's power based on firstly the Muslim community within the regional formal party chapter. He believed that the nominal majority of the Muslims in the country, and particularly in his region of Surakarta, would presumably support the party's cause. But he also argued that by opening up the close interest of the party to, for instance, the idea of common justice would make up more the image of the party and therefore the party reap and gather larger votes. The party chapter under Moedrick, consequently, also targets at the Muslims in other social and political groupings.


b) What general process of democratization do the actors go for?

(General elections as a paramount mean toward democracy)
Moedrick saw that general election was one of possible means towards democratization process, in which the political parties shared respective participation into the institution of political constellation. He added, general election was also universally acknowledged as an institution and political practice that enabled the formation of representative government as the most acclaimed ideal and optimal achievement of democratic governance nowadays. As the party chapter's chairman, he was convinced of adopting election as his choice to enhance people's participation into governance, and hence popular control would at least affect, or better put, contribute a say to the governance.

(Direct and at the same time representative participation in the existing system)
If the election went normal, no other jeopardizing factors, he said, the people's participation would be necessarily "representative" and not necessarily "direct". However, if the dominating groups insisted to dictate to the people their own interests, more that the people's welfare, the "direct" mean of representation in the form of "mass rallies" would be taken as an alternative to put pressure on them.

(Avoiding strong Islamic interests of the party)
Moedrick took the line of avoiding strong and exclusive Islamic interests of the PPP in order to gain larger participation of the people in general. As he was aware that Muslims are not found only in the specifically his own party and Islam-related associations and yet he aims at their votes, he deliberately took an open line in asserting issues in the public discourse.

(Always conveying the most simplest political issue)
Moedrick said he focused on the most plain and less complicated political issues to be raised in the public to make the public easily caught them. Mostly, the issues were about injustice and arrogance performed and committed by the government's officials and their allies in the ruling party Golkar.

According to the actors, the above should be accomplished by way of:

(Within the existing system, most importantly the rule of law)
Moedrick takes the course of struggling towards democracy within the existing system. He maintained that it was difficult to bring about changes. He then preferred to stress there was no need for new laws, emphasizing the preference of the primacy of law. Legal battle, thereby respecting existing legal system, even though corrupt, was among the best means to adopt and even raise further pressure on the dominating groups. He said the party chapter took the choice of restoring the existing law in the society in general and executing it consistently. The Indonesian constitution has been a good law, he said, only that it was being violated all the time by the ruling regime. To improve the wellbeing of the people, the law has to be respected and there has to be legal justice. At the political level the concept of trias politica should be applied. Real democracy would stem out of the strife to maintain that the executive, legislative and judicial powers should function independently of each other.


D. Actors' own politics of democratization


1. Space
How do the actors' themselves analyze the political opportunity structure? (i.e. what, according to the actors, is possible to do -- and why is that?) (E.g. can one work inside the established political system or not? Does one have to politically create or liberate civil society before working there?)

Actors' analysis of political opportunity structure

(The government's heedlessness prompted political openness)
Moedrick and his associates in the party chapter saw that political development under the New Order regime had reached a phase of "no return". The exponents of ruling party Golkar and most conspicuously its individuals in the government had shown commonly unacceptable attitudes in public policy. Moedrick was quite aware of the people's protracted disgruntle over various repression and injustice practices they had been enduring since. He saw that the insensitivity of the government officials had adversely resulted in that the larger people apart from his own supporters endorsed to his movement. Moedrick saw the political opportunity to adopt was in the reacting the government insensitiveness and shamelessness (tak tahu malu). Moedrick said issues of manifest injustice in the form of corruption and collusion among the government officials and the private sectors gradually becomes paramount reasons of raising issues for political struggle. He saw the possibility of increasing support of the people from below by promoting the idea of justice.

(Trigger of further support from below and therefore larger political openness)
However, the most conspicuous political opportunity, which Moedrick and his associates saw, was the raging measure that later triggered people strong disagreement when the local government of Central Java in late 1996 instructed his officials in the lower levels in the whole region to paint yellow all public objects. Moedrick said he supported the majority of the people's reaction to reject the government's policy. Adopting many commonly unacceptable measures taken by the government might become a vehicle to draw pressure from below to the local élites.

(Military's loose approval)
Moedrick also saw that the military at least supported his and the party's position towards the government's reckless public policy. The military silently supported Moedrick and his party's white painting actions. Moedrick knew that the local military commander did not approve governor the governor's policy mostly for arrogance and insensitiveness in dealing with larger people's interest. The military was also quite overwhelmed when in April 1997 riots flared up at various locations in Central Java in the course toward the general election in May 1997.

(Partly rejecting full participation in the existing system)
Moedrick approved his colleagues at the Surakarta district level taking their choices and political maneuvers towards nomination and later appointment as the local councilors. However, he personally rejected to be appointed as a member of the local council, either at the level of Surakarta district or Central Java province. Apart from that, Moedrick has a separate personal income from his business, inherited from his family background. Even he constantly raised an issue that the provincial council be dissolved, as he saw structurally the institution and its members had nothing to contribute to the people's benefit, but corruption and abuse of the offices, instead. He took this way to overemphasize the focusing preference of justice, alluding that the local councils were the place where the members were committed to rampant corruption and collusion.

(Mass rallies from below and lobbying local élites)
In the local politics in a relatively limited areas such as Surakarta municipality and its surrounding areas, and the Central Java province, Moedrick said he opted to combine the forces from below in mass rallies with people, as many as possible, starting from his party supporters, and from above with lobbying the local élites, and if the time was ripe the national élites should be also approached. It was because Moedrick saw some opportunity learning from the ways how the decay of the New Order regime had become too conspicuous, and yet he realized to have also heaped all the people's supports from the grassroots.


2. Politicization
(a) What issues and/or interests do the actors politicize?
(b) How is that done? (1. by focussing on single issues or ideologies -- and/or by focussing on narrow/special interests or wider/collective interests? 2. by only putting forward demands to the state/government/ boss/company or also by trying to create alternatives on their own?)

Issues and interests

The general election remained an important occasion for the party that its particular issue of "fair election" stemming out of the idea of justice and equality should be developed. Among the electoral issues raised by Moedrick and his supporters are: (1) the unfairness of the government's public policy of painting in yellow any public object as a disguise of electoral campaign (2) coalition issue between the PPP local chapter and the PDI local chapter, (3) vote-rigging issue against the ruling party of Golkar, (4) the impropriety of the government officials being involved in electoral campaign, (5) the prevailing people's desire of quickened social change. Meanwhile, the main interest of Moedrick and his supporters refers to raising votes for the party chapter.

Ways of politicizing issues and interests

(Direct and continuously)
Moedrick directly launched the issue of injustice and equality during the electoral campaign, referring to various violations and abuses of power committed by the government officials and Golkar's exponents. The party chapter continuously stressed on forwarding in the public discourse the very basic single issue of justice coupled with equality, which then applied to diverse similar issues when related and suitable happenings took place, and later and alternately, in the phase of people's mobilization, interchanged with and crystallized into the "white painting actions". This optional issue was adopted repeatedly and continuously by Moedrick and his supporters in order to maximally produce a poignant, straightforward basic idea of justice and equality of the people.

(Coupling the issues of justice with the interest of voting for the party)
During the electoral campaigns, Moedrick and his party exponents almost always raised the issue of injustice committed by the government officials and at the end of the electoral campaign they stressed the interest of voting the party in the ballot. They heaped massive support from the issue of injustice at the first place and launched the interest at the very last moment of the campaign to avoid breaking down the scheduled electoral campaign of gathering as many supporters as possible in the street rallies.

(Developing issue of anti-yellowization through elaborating people's opinion in polling)
Cognitive acknowledgement of the chosen single issue of anti government's policy of yellowization was the first step towards public space, by attaining the one-month observation before publicly announcing the conclusion that "the government's yellowization program contravened public decency". This was political statement based on morality, implicitly sending political signal of resistance to the adversaries, although the party chapter's members themselves apparently already knew what the polling would result in. White is supposedly a neutral color, as Moedrick himself maintained, implying that he suppressed the formal color of green of the Islamic-orientated PPP but also against the yellow dominance of the ruling government party Golkar.

However, the polling, as a way of dealing with the uncertainty of the impact of the government's policy, had created a modality of people's trust. To win people, once again, another polling was carried out after severe counterattack from either local government or the Golkar's affiliated organizations. The local PPP staff of researchers announces in March 11 the poll result asserting that the majority of city dwellers did not agree with the program. It was a kind of confirmation of the people's will to contend their political rights against the authority. This method might only imply a maneuver in conveying pre-conceived political position into the public regardless its scientific integrity that the raised issue might further snowball.

(Direct response to the Golkar's launched issues and movements)
In sharpening the party's own issues, Moedrick attempted to uncover the reasoning in each statement issued by his political opponents (the government and Golkar's exponents) so that the latter gain less votes from the people.

(Open communication with the mass media's people)
Mass communication proves in Moedrick's movement as an effective means to send political signals to the adversaries as well as other political forces which may come together into the same cause or perhaps those who have coalescent potential. Moedrick's capacity to diction compatible to the press tendency was exceptional which then makes him more attractive and the press easily to quote him. As compared to government's officials and even the PDI functionaries, Moedrick has never created any communicative distance to reporters to get information and quotes from him. During the electoral campaign on May he proved himself as a fierce demagogue as well.

(Open ideological orientation of the PPP)
Moedrick did not stick to the party's traditional orientation of Islamic teachings. The PPP itself has changed its ideological character since the fusion in 1971 and later when the Soeharto government compelled political party to adhere to state ideology Pancasila (asas tunggal) in 1983. Moedrick was born out of Islamic family from Muhammadiyah but with a strong abangan background, a middle class Muslim (santri) having relatively strong leaning to religious reform. He deliberately stretched his mind and the issue of the movement to the level of more extended notion of justice. By this mean he was able to invite other political groupings to involve. The internal situation of the PDI after being repressed on July 27, 1996 crackdown expedited the latter to join to Moedrick's movement.

(Alternative effort)
The Surakarta PPP supporters were sometime in an impasse when there was no way out in engendering further movement. To anticipate such a situation, Moedrick built a co-operative association in order to gather the PPP supporters to have regular meetings at least aiming at exchanging information of the economic, social and political development and in the meantime they held occasions to contribute and take turns of sum of money (arisan).


3. Political inclusion
How do the actors try to mobilize people? I.e. with what means do they try to organize and rally people? E.g. do they use populism or clientelism or alternative patronage? Or do they try to integrate (rather than incorporate) people into politics by using some kind of networking with informal leaders or more structural organizing with formal leaders?

a. Political mobilization

(Maximizing personal character for people mobilization through populism)
People mobilization was mainly based on populist personal character of Moedrick, thereby through his populism patronage as the present local PPP chapter with a long-standing experience of political carrier within the party. Moedrick's personal character much helped the task as he was easily involved with common people, mostly even with the poor and the latter did not have much reserve to get close to him whenever they needed his help. All of the movements were not to detach from his populist leaning in approaching the public. His susceptibility towards poor people, who often came to him for help, would readily make him to take their side in front of larger political structure.

(Further notes on Moedrick's personal background as a modality for people mobilization)
As compared to intellectual-inclined and outstanding Muslim politician Amien Rais, who was Moedrick's elementary school classmate, the latter has a "fearless" personal character, unfalteringly involved in physical duel fight. He dares to beat anybody who treats him unfairly. He managed his "cowboy" demeanor to charm to youth mass of people. He was not graduated either from the economic or psychology faculty which he frequented at the Yogyakarta-based University of Gajahmada. He started his political carrier once he joined the Indonesian Muslim Party (Parmusi) in 1971. After the government's political policy of party fusion, he later joined the local PPP and appointed as the chairman of the party youth organization of Pemuda Bintang Belia in 1977-1978. But at the same time he gained galvanizing position by his appointment as the party internal security (satgas) which he enjoyed until 1992. His position as the city neighborhood Serengan sub-district PPP chief in 1985 led him to a more structural involvement until he was appointed the chairman of the Surakarta chapter in 1995.

(Actions engendered further political actions)
After enough struggling to understand the government's attitude and his party supporters' resistance, Moedrick and his confidants in the chapter eventually were confirmed that the idea of white painting already became an adequate choice to show the people's strength vis a vis the state. It was meaningful enough to politically impose the idea into the public space with street action. The party encouragement and co-ordination of the supporters to the street actions by changing the color yellow painted objects into white proved that the relatively conspicuous movement in public space had created a repercussion among the Surakarta town dweller which then generated street protests against the government's unfair policy. And in turn it automatically engendered further political movements.

(Legal battle generated further movements)
Third, legal course in the battle against the government's accusation of transgression existing regulations instilled the people's sense of fairness with contrast to the government's excessive measure in imposing power, even in the form of "such triviality" such as color. It was, in fact, an effective way to open mass communication and people's involvement and mobilization. It generated also people's sense of bravery to challenge the seemingly unshakably powerful government with military machinery protecting their questionable wealth.

(Cooperation with the local Megawati supporters)
Moedrick and his confidants in the party chapter opened wide the door toward co-operation, or probably political coalition with the local PDI supporters, who were desperate in channeling their aspiration after the military crackdown and the deposition of its chairperson Megawati endured by the party in the national level. The coalescent mobilization grew rapidly, which may be seen in the following process: first, painting in white carried out by the PPP supporters; second, painting in read and white by the Megawati supporters; third, while maintaining the issue of doing justice Moedrick accepted the Megawati proposal to "entrusting their votes" to PPP; fourth, asking Megawati's approval although she gave only passive affirmation; and fifth, while during the month of electoral campaign Moedrick supported the waves of massive rallies, finally he turned back to assert that "voting for the PPP is the only way to people sovereignty."

In the overall account of the development of the political co-operation, Moedrick was less active in promoting the mobilization. He first looked at the degree of emotion concerning the suppressed will of the people, since they had already their own agenda in what to do in imagined politics in the comparatively already-set in mind of the electoral campaign. Moedrick has mostly maintained long-term social relation with the PDI supporters. It remained his task to encourage their aspiration and eventually accepted and included into politics them as if it is only his gratuity towards reckless Megawati supporters desperately seeking for space to express themselves, no longer talking about their own fate being suppressed by government. It was the least possible involvement that Megawati supporters can still go ahead in protest against the government.

b. The kind of people included in the mobilization process

The social and political groupings in Surakarta were the core of the target of Moedrick's movement. Larger segments of the society in fact later participated in the movement. There are at least two kinds of people being mobilized whose ways of inclusion into politics correspond with their political character. Here it is worth elaborating several of them:

The PPP circles

These people are those who politically have common interests in the PPP's justice and Islamic-oriented issues, hence the PPP Surakarta chapter did not employ special political maneuver in including them into politics. They may be divided into three groups.

a. Local party supporters

They are the first target of extent of the democratization process developed by Moedrick, constituting the first group of mass base. They are mostly local people gathered mainly at the Surakarta branch of the Muhammadiyah social, religious community. These people enjoy close relation with Moedrick's and they are in the same line with their patron Moedrick's choices and options. There are scarcely complaints in exercising internal democracy within the organization, although the dominant supporters of the party are mostly Muslim, who have the characteristic of less demanding immediate democracy as compared to the liberal.

b. The other chapters of the party

The other chapters are not subordinates of Moedrick who was appointed the chairman of the Surakarta's PPP chapter in June 1995. They have to be persuaded to understand Moedrick's political choice in painting-in-white action. They know each other as they often meet in the central board meetings that they have a good acquaintance of who Moedrick is. In January 1997 the white painting action spread out of the city. Five other chapters in the province, namely Sukoharjo, Wonogiri, Sragen, Kudus and Demak, supported Moedrick by sending letters of support. And they came after the action. Similar happening takes place in larger, farther locations when the coalition of PPP and Megawati supporters came on the way. Both supporters mixed up to each others and took the political course into street rallies in the province, those are in Yogyakarta, Kebumen, Magelang, Semarang, even up to the national level in Jakarta and other province in Bogor.

c. Muslim women participation

There were some women having significant positions in the Surakarta PPP chapter, which Moedrick approves, such as respected Nurjanah Hilal, Endang Masitoh and Siti Zulekha. They were quite outspoken in the chapter's meetings or even in public seminar discussing on political matters. They organized many women in the painting in yellow actions.

However, women's right struggle during the Moedrick's case is actually almost not heard, even though the women suffrage was bigger than men's. There were 172.891 women's and 153.773 men's suffrages, meaning that the women suppose to have two more seats compared to men. At local people's council they suppose to get 22 from among 40 seats. But, it was not heard at all that politicians, even female, speaking for the improvement of women's condition. In the campaigns most of the participants are men, implying that politically women in Surakarta were still much under-represented.

d. Other Muslims

Moedrick saw that there were large number of Muslims, either self-declared or not, in the other political and social groupings aside from the formal Islamic-oriented party of the PPP. He often mentioned that the party chapter wanted to create an open image that the party's cause does not only target the Muslims within the party, but apart from it there are still huge number of prospective voters. According to Moedrick, they presumably also possible supporters, direct or indirectly, of the PPP.


The splintered PDI supporters

Moedrick succeeded in also including large number of nationalist party of PDI which recently had been sacked following the July 1996 crackdown. At least as he focused the movement in the party-supervised area of Surakarta, then most of the included PDI supporters came from local chapter of the splintered PDI. However, as the movement larger resonated even at national level, presumably he garnered larger number of supporters as compared merely at the level of Surakarta mayoralty.

The Megawati supporters are "accident" target groups of Moedrick's movement as he has long social relation with them. In term of cultural category, the abangan background of Moedrick helped open the party to other similar political groupings to join in the movement, mostly are the Megawati supporters. The grassroots people within the PPP's extent have direct contact in everyday life with their counterpart in the PDI circles, which then facilitated the co-operation between both. What Moedrick did within the PPP would easily reverberate in the PDI massive grassroots circles. The coalescent movement between both during the 1997 electoral campaign proved that the extent of Moedrick's movement actually had an even larger participation apart from only Megawati supporters.


People recruited in the movement by way of clientelism approach

Each party involved in the relation among the PPP, the underground people and local businessmen apparently compromised to find a particular way in such political situation developed in Surakarta in the time when Moedrick appeared as the local party's chairman. They are most susceptible to another possible dominating group and become a political tool in the hand of the dominating groups in the political arena, that is ruling party Golkar and its allies in the government. In a similar way, the underground people are also prone to co-operate with Moedrick and his party. In Indonesia, the underworld, used to be labeled as "criminals", is already notoriously known as the political partner of the establishment in a bid to beat down adversaries. In a similar mode of political mobilization, the businessmen are among those loyal to the government since they economically and politically owe to the development program of the government. However, the lower level of businessmen suffered the same injustice as the rest of the mass PPP and PDI supporters, because they gained less concession as compared to the politically better-connected businessmen in the higher level of business deals. For this sensitive political stance, Moedrick may reach them as among his cause supporters.


a. The underworld of Surakarta

Moedrick inherits this world from his father Malkan Sangidoe, who had a close relation with the alleged hoodlum, locally called as preman. But he does not claim the pattern in including the underworld to his party movement of his own. The underworld scope reaches larger even into other political grouping of Golkar. The government party Golkar does not refuse to have also vast connections with the preman., even they are included into part of the economic development program of the government.

b. Local Chinese businessmen

Moedrick and his supporters also managed to reach the local Chinese businessmen into at least supporting his movement, mostly in term of financial aids. As Moedrick has clout among the underworld people, whom many of the Chinese business people ask for protection to their business. For that reason, more opportunities are open for Moedrick to urge the businessmen for the work employment of the premans. The latest service that Moedrick gave to the premans strengthened his political subordination to the underworld. Moedrick deployed these people in many of his movements including the white painting actions. In addition, many of the Chinese are Protestant and Catholic, the religious communities that were also affected by Moedrick in the city. Moedrick asked people in such a scope of religious relation for their support by inducing an emphasis of preferential issue of social harmony and justice among the town dwellers.


4. Student groups

The students were not particularly the PPP's target groups because even they actually had started the anti-yellowization drive before Moedrick launched his first movement in the streets. However, although there were no formal sign that they joined the white painting action, the students were definitely of Moedrick's concern. The student group close to Moedrick's movement was the Fatherland Lovers Student Solidarity (Solidaritas Mahasiswa Pencinta Tanah Air), an alliance of student groups from various universities in the city with its meeting point at the Muhammadiyah University of Surakarta. Many of the students helped the research and development department of the Surakarta PPP chapter. They joined the policy making process and even in the political actions of the chapter. They often held public discussions on the political matters, including anti-yellowization issue. And many of them conducted the PPP's investigation by holding polling on the people's response to the yellowization program.


5. People from the Surakarta palace

The palace square is considered among the most strategic location in the city. Therefore, either the government, the PPP chapter or the responsible of the king palace felt to have their rights over it. The government officials painted yellow and the PPP chapter repainted in white. It happened several times to and fro between yellow and white painting actions. It made certainly the palace guards concerned, moreover regarding to the prescribed government decree in which the palace has to be well preserved. Many of the palace people, in fact, were involved in the white painting action in the palace square. The Surakarta king Pakubowono XII himself supported the action publicly stating that he did like the palace being "politicized" because the palace neighborhood was painted in the dominant party's color of yellow. The forum of the palace defenders eventually sued the city mayor over the yellowization of the palace which broke the law, demanding the mayor to ask for forgiveness to the king and all city dwellers through the press and television and radio stations.


6. Other social groupings

a. Local artists

Surakarta artist circles led by Murtidjono, the head of local cultural center (Taman Budaya Surakarta), echoed the concern that freedom of expression in art cannot be limited only into the color of yellow, although no artist was involved in the painting action. They mostly raised the issue of freedom of expression should be well maintained, because yellowization was among the government's repressive measures over public possibility to express themselves in term of color.

b. Kedung Ombo villagers

Displaced people of Kedung Ombo after the submersion their villages over the dam project in 1990 happened to ask Moedrick for help because Kedung Pring village head Darsono was accused of subversion for suggesting local people to abstain from the election. Police had been trying to arrest him. Moedrick was quite helpful to the man, a deed that he often did. Moedrick set a team of defense lawyers and sent some of his people to guard in case there was some terror against the village people. Moedrick managed to be compromising the Armed Forces' Strategic Reserve commander Major General Subagyo. Even though Subagyo said that Darsono should be punished for subversion, Moedrick managed to release him from threat and terror. The adherence between both remains, even they planned to file lawsuit against the World Bank over Kedung Ombo case.


E. The constituents' view of democracy

The constituents of the Surakarta PPP chapter would include (1) the PPP supporters themselves, (2) the mass grassroots of splintered PDI supporters, (3) students, and (4) network of lower traders at the common marketplaces and some businessmen and middle class professionals.

For most of local PPP supporters, democracy means "to have more a say in the public space". They found that so far they had been suppressed their participation in local politics, even in terms of only voicing out their concerns. In the context of unilateral government's policy of yellowization, most of the constituents said that democracy means "resistance against the oppressor". They feel that Moedrick and his party movement channeled their aspiration, therefore they were ready to directly support the party's movement. During the mass rallies they found quite "freedom" in airing the suppressed public emotion by ways of almost physical behavior of self-indulgence in the mass of crowd up to over 200,000 people in the last round of the electoral campaign in 1997.

The splintered PDI supporters were also of similar outlook with the PPP ones, except that they had different political motives. They were enduring more bitter suppression after the July 27, 1996 crackdown, which made them curbed for not having proper channel to express their grievance during the electoral period, even their national leaders Megawati decided to join in the electoral campaign and promoting to be abstain from the ballot box. They found democracy that was raised by Moedrick in term of "protection of poor people" was suitable to their longing. And yet, the populist character of Moedrick was quite similar with Megawati, who inherited her father Sukarno's legacy of populism. The brave personal character of Moedrick drew more of their sympathy, mostly for the massive supporter of Megawati from the rowdy people in the grassroots.

As for the students, they specifically supported Moedrick during the anti-yellowization drive against the government. The drive that had more symbolical meaning was suitable to the student's political disposition. They were of the position that democracy should be "a critical stance to the establishment and a preference to political changes." They found some of such democracy in the Moedrick movement. However, many of the students were skeptical to the existing political system, including political party, in which Moedrick was confirmed of going through. They expressed the critical stance to establishment by supporting Moedrick in more intellectual contribution, such as backing the polling over government's policy of yellowization and snowballing resistance among the people, starting in the public discourse, to the government by holding political debates and discussions.

Network of lower traders at the common marketplaces and some businessmen and middle class professionals found in Moedrick's movement a kind of "solidarity feeling", because Moedrick himself was a businessman who relied on the basic spirit of free market, thereby openness and fair competition. Therefore, they easily offered help, mostly financial aid, to Moedrick's movement. They were of the opinion that democracy should be firstly directed to "social and political changes" in such as closed and unilateral political system in the local politics, dominated by the government in almost all walks of public life. The ethnic Chinese businessmen also saw that Moedrick was a fair counterpart in business, which was presumably in parallel to his political strife. Political economy allowed both parties to join in resistance against the dominant economic share in the hand of the government and its allies.***


Bibliography

Petra R. de Leeuw, "Islam Yes, Partai Islam …?" Islam, Democracy and Leadership in Contemporary Indonesian Politics, termpaper presented to the Free University of Amsterdam, 1997-1998.
R. William Liddle, Pemilu-pemilu Orde Baru: Pasang Surut Kekuasaan Politik (General Elections during the New Order: Ups and Downs of Political Power), Jakarta: LP3ES, 1992.
Made Tony Supriatma and the Society Information Forum (Wimas, Wahana Informasi Masyarakat), "Mega Bintang: Massa-Rakyat Lokal Menuntut Hak Sipil dan Politik" (Mega Bintang alliance: Local People Demand for Civil and Polical Rights), book draft scheduled to be published by the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI), 1998.
Electoral booklet published by the campaign department of the Democratic People's Party (PRD), "For the Sake of Democracy, the Democratic People's Party Refuses to Bow", 1999.
The case-related publications of diverse newspapers of Jakarta-based The Jakarta Post, Republika, Kompas; Yogyakarta based Bernas; and Semarang-based Suara Merdeka and Wawasan.

Interviews with

Moedrick Sangidoe, Surakarta, May 1998, conducted by Prasetyohadi, Benny Subianto, Wisnu Hardana.
Habib Hasan Mulachela, Surakarta PPP deputy chairman, Surakarta, June 1998, conducted by Teddy Novan.
Prijo Wasono, PRD activist, Surakarta, June 1998, conducted by Wisnu Hardana.


This article was made possible by assistant researchers: Teddy Novan, Wisnu Hardana, and Benny Subianto; Academic supervisors: Olle Törnquist and Arief Budiman; Host organization: The Institute for the Studies of Free Flow Information (ISAI), Jakarta.